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Abstract
We show that currencies with a steeper yield curve tend to depreciate at business cy-
cle horizons, in violation of uncovered interest parity (UIP), but the yield curve adds no
explanatory power over and above interest differentials in explaining the exchange rate at
longer horizons. We argue that exchange rate risk premia reallocate returns intertempo-
rally to investors who value them relatively highly, reflecting transitory innovations to their
stochastic discount factor consistent with business cycle risk. Using holding period returns,
we identify a tent-shape relationship, across horizons, between dollar-bond excess returns
for long maturity bonds and the relative slope. In addition, we find that short-horizon UIP
deviations switch sign following yield curve inversions, consistent with the interpretation
of inversions as indicators of changes in growth and inflation expectations. We show that
accounting for liquidity yields does not alter our results, but rather contributes to explain-
ing cross-sectional differences across currencies, consistent with permanent innovations to
agents’ stochastic discount factor.
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1 Introduction
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) predicts that, under risk neutrality, a high interest rate currency
should depreciate to equalise exchange rate-adjusted returns on assets. As is well known, the
UIP hypothesis is empirically rejected at short to medium horizons: high yield currencies tend
to excessively appreciate (or insufficiently depreciate), giving rise to exchange rate risk premia
(ERRP) that complicate forecasting the level and volatility of exchange rates. But the UIP
hypothesis cannot be rejected at long horizons (e.g. Chinn and Meredith, 2005; Engel, 2016).
These two pieces of evidence together set the stage for our analysis of the ‘UIP puzzle’.
In this paper, we show that information in the yield curve, over and above spot interest rate
differentials, greatly improves explanatory power for exchange rates, specifically at business cycle
horizons. We show this both by estimating UIP regressions across different maturities and by
analysing excess returns over different holding periods. We interpret our findings through the
lens of a standard no-arbitrage model and the decomposition of the stochastic discount factor
(SDF) into transitory and permanent components proposed by Alvarez and Jermann (2005).
The term structure of interest rates—specifically, the risk-free government bond yield curve—is
not only a key component of a risk-neutral arbitrage relationship characterising exchange rate
movements, but also prices transitory innovations to investors’ SDFs. Our results suggest that
exchange rate movements in excess UIP systematically reallocate returns intertemporally, to
investors who value them most highly.
To motivate our analysis, Figure 1 plots the adjustedR2 of a canonical panel UIP regression—
a regression of the κ-period-ahead exchange rate change on κ-maturity cross-country yield
differentials—together with the adjusted R2 from the same regression extended to include mea-
sures of the cross-country relative yield curve slope and curvature. As shown in the figure, we
find strong evidence that information in the yield curve can account for exchange rate fluctu-
ations over and above the spot rate differential. The adjusted R2 of our augmented regression
is around treble that of the canonical UIP regression at business cycle horizons (3 to 4 years).
Coefficient estimates indicate that a country with a steeper yield curve tends to experience a
depreciation over time, and the relationship exhibits a tent shape with respect to the horizon:
rising from zero at short horizons, achieving a peak around medium, business cycle, horizons
and falling to zero at longer horizons.1
Building on this, we consider a flexible empirical specification which allows bond holding
periods and maturities to differ. We regress excess returns—for different maturity bonds over
varying holding periods—on relative yield curve slopes. We find that the relative slope is a
significant predictor of dollar-bond excess return differences, at holding periods associated with
business cycle horizons (around 3 years), even with long-maturity bonds (up to 10 years).2
1Throughout, the exchange rate is defined as the domestic price of foreign currency, so an increase or a positive
coefficient denotes a domestic depreciation.
2These holding-period regressions also help to assuage worries around the limited number of non-overlapping
observations in long-horizon UIP regressions. They can be interpreted as a hybrid regression specification, in
between the long-horizon regressions of Chinn and Meredith (2005) and the one-period holding-period return
regressions for 10-year bonds in Lustig et al. (2019).
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Figure 1: Explanatory power of UIP regression augmented with relative yield curve slope and
curvature at different horizons
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Notes: Plot of the adjusted R2 from the standard UIP regression of ex post exchange rate changes on horizon-
specific interest rate differentials (thin, red, crosses) and a UIP regression augmented with the relative yield
curve slope and curvature (thick, black, circles), at different horizons κ (horizontal axis, in months). Regressions
estimated using pooled end-of-month data for six currencies (AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP) vis-a`-vis
the USD from 1980:01 to 2017:12, and include country fixed effects.
Nonetheless, the term structure of carry trade is decreasing with maturity at every holding
period, consistent with the empirical findings in Lustig, Stathopoulos, and Verdelhan (2019).3
Taken together, our results indicate that the term structure of interest rates explains signifi-
cant variation in ERRP at medium horizons. We argue that these findings point to an important
role for transitory innovations to investors’ SDFs (building on the decomposition proposed in
Alvarez and Jermann, 2005) in explaining ERRP, consistent with differences in the pricing of
business cycle risk across countries, as captured by the relative yield curve slope.
In a standard two-country asset pricing setup, ERRP arise as equilibrium outcomes, neces-
sary to compensate risk-averse investors for macroeconomic risks. UIP failures can be under-
stood with reference to risk-averse investors’ current and future valuation of returns, summarised
by the path of relative SDFs, and serve to reallocate returns intertemporally. For instance, an
expected foreign exchange appreciation (domestic depreciation) increases the expected return
from a foreign bond in domestic currency, while a subsequent depreciation lowers future ex-
pected returns. Empirically, we find that movements in the ERRP systematically reallocate
3The decreasing term structure of carry trade returns is rationalised by Gourinchas, Ray, and Vayanos (2019)
in a framework with segmented markets and constrained arbitrageurs.
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returns to investors with a relatively high valuation of returns, thus lowering the risk for home
investors holding foreign assets. Since in periods where valuations of returns are high, yields on
domestic risk-free bonds are low, this mechanism is consistent with the UIP puzzle.
We derive the relationship between ERRP and the relative yield curve slope. When yield
curves are upward sloping on average, nearer-term return valuations—reflected by nearer-term
SDFs—are high relative to longer-horizon valuations reflecting business cycle risk.4 In our
two-country setting, relative yield curve slopes influence exchange rate dynamics because they
capture investors’ relative desire to reallocate returns intertemporally—i.e. in response to tran-
sitory innovations to their SDF. ERRP, arising from an excess exchange rate depreciation,
reallocate returns intertemporally to the country with a relatively high near-term valuation
only in so far as it also faces a declining path of future valuations (reflected by a relatively steep
slope). In this case, domestic investors are worse-off both relative to foreigners, and over time
(in a business cycle sense). In contrast, permanent innovations to SDFs do not result in a desire
for intertemporal reallocation of returns and consequently are neither captured by bond premia,
nor require exchange rates to reallocate returns across time. Thus, we argue that relative yield
curve slopes capture business cycle risk as a key determinant of exchange rate predictability.
To gain insight on the relationship between ERRP and the relative yield curve slope, we con-
struct two stylised examples, in which asset markets are complete and investors’ pricing kernels
follow independent mean-reverting first and second-order autoregressive processes, respectively.
In both examples, the relationship is positive and in the latter example, we show that the
relationship can have a tent shape with respect to the horizon, mirroring our empirical results.
We extend our empirical specification to account for liquidity yields—the non-monetary
return that government bonds provide because of their safety, ease of resale, and value as
collateral—highlighted by Engel and Wu (2018) as an important predictor of exchange rate
movements. The extension serves two purposes. First, using data on US Treasury premia from
Du, Im, and Schreger (2018), we show that our main results regarding relative yield curve
factors and business cycle risk are robust to the inclusion of cross-country liquidity yields as
additional regressors. Second, through the lens of our theory, we show that, in contrast to
business cycle risk, liquidity yields appear to reflect permanent innovations to SDFs. A key
novelty of our work is to assess the differential influence of liquidity yields at different horizons.
We find evidence that the addition of horizon-specific cross-country liquidity yields increases
the explanatory power of our yield curve-augmented regression at medium to long horizons,
suggesting that liquidity yields reflect permanent innovations to SDFs. So, while liquidity
yields is an important factor for understanding the cross-sectional dimension of UIP failures,
business cycle risk which is our main focus, reflects the time-series dimension of UIP failures.
Finally, we unveil a novel empirical fact about the joint dynamics of ERRP and the yield
curve consistent with the idea that business cycle risk is a driver of both. We find that while
conventional short-horizon UIP failures arise when yield curves are upward sloping, the UIP
coefficient switches sign when the foreign yield curve is inverted, but the sign of the relative
4Wachter (2006) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) discuss this negative intertemporal correlation of SDFs in
a closed economy setup.
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slope remains unchanged. Notably, this result holds whether or not we include the 2007-9 global
financial crisis. This finding suggests that the ‘New Fama Puzzle’ highlighted by Bussie`re,
Chinn, Ferrara, and Heipertz (2018)—that high-yield currencies experienced a depreciation in
excess of UIP after the global financial crisis—is a recurrent phenomenon that can be related
to yield curve inversions. Our findings are consistent with a model of rare disasters (Gabaix,
2012; Farhi and Gabaix, 2016).
Related Literature Our work is related to a classic literature on the forward premium
puzzle rooted in Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Fama (1984), and analysis of the UIP across
time (Engel, 2016) and horizons (e.g. Chinn and Meredith, 2005; Chinn and Quayyum, 2012).5
Building on this, our analysis is focused on a cross-time component of UIP failures, which
Hassan and Mano (2019) show is an important component of exchange rate predictability,6
highlighting the role of business cycle risk in explaining exchange rate dynamics.
Closely related to this paper, Lustig et al. (2019) investigate the term structure of carry
trade returns. They show that whilst carry trade portfolios are profitable with short-maturity
Treasuries, the returns to carry trade, for a fixed one-month holding period, are monotonically
decreasing in the maturity of the asset as currency risk premia are offset by local-currency bond
premia. Complementing this finding, we show that for given maturity bonds, the predictability
of currency risk premia dominates as holding periods increase. Both our paper and Lustig et al.
(2019) build on Alvarez and Jermann (2005), who propose a decomposition of the SDF into a
permanent and a transitory component.
Our paper provides novel insights about the relevance of business cycle risk, priced into the
yield curve, in explaining time series variation in ERRP. In a related paper, Colacito, Riddiough,
and Sarno (2019) show that sorting currencies according to their output gap delivers positive
excess portfolio returns, indicative of a role for business cycles in explaining cross-sectional
variation in ERRP. Insofar as a high output gap contributes to a steeper yield curve slope, our
finding that a relatively steep yield curve is associated with a contemporaneously appreciated
currency (depreciating going forward) is consistent with the findings in Colacito et al. (2019)
for excess portfolio returns. Furthermore, our paper highlights the differing implications of
transitory (business cycle) and permanent SDF innovations for variation in ERRP.
Our empirical framework also relates closely to a largely atheoroetic literature linking the
term structure of interest rates to exchange rates. Ang and Chen (2010), Chen and Tsang (2013)
and Gra¨b and Kostka (2018) show that yield curve factors can significantly predict exchange
rates, predominantly focusing on short horizons (less than 2 years). We show the role of the
term structure in explaining medium-horizon ERRP fluctuations and, within our theoretical
setup, directly attribute this to transitory SDF innovations.
5Engel’s findings correspond to those in Chinn and Meredith (2005) if the expectations hypothesis of interest
rates holds and interest rate differentials are characterised by a first-order Markov process.
6Hassan and Mano (2019) decompose the failure of the UIP into cross-currency, between-time-and-currency,
and cross-time components. While they show that exchange rate predictability relies predominantly on the cross-
time component, carry trade returns are driven by the cross-currency component and particularly permanent, or
highly persistent, differences across currencies.
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We further contribute to a literature studying the role of liquidity for exchange rate dynamics
(see, e.g. Engel and Wu, 2018; Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig, 2018) by investigating the
relationship between the term structure of liquidity yields and exchange rates. We show that,
unlike business cycle risk contained in bond premia, liquidity yields also explain permanent
innovations to exchange rates and thus contribute to cross-sectional differences across currencies.
An emerging literature argues that representative-agent no-arbitrage models struggle to de-
liver the equilibrium pricing kernels required to reconcile exchange rate dynamics consistent
with observed UIP deviations as well as price other assets in the economy. Greenwood, Hanson,
Stein, and Sunderam (2019) and Gourinchas et al. (2019) present two-country general equi-
librium models based on segmented markets which reconcile the joint dynamics of exchange
rate and bond risk premia presented in Lustig et al. (2019).7 Indeed, in sections 4 and 5 of our
paper, we present additional results, relating to liquidity and yield curve inversions respectively,
which largely provide support to this argument. However, in section 3 we show that, at least
qualitatively, simple pricing kernels which arise naturally in representative agent economies
are consistent with our main finding—the tent-shape relationship between relative yield curve
slopes and ERRP.
Bussie`re et al. (2018) and Stavrakeva and Tang (2019), inter alia, document a reversal
in the direction of UIP failures following the global financial crisis, with high yield currencies
depreciating rather than appreciating. We show that reversals in the joint dynamics of exchange
and interest rates are associated with yield curve inversions. In 5.2 we argue that prominent
consumption-based asset pricing models that reconcile the UIP puzzle rely on either external
habits as in Verdelhan (2010), building on Campbell and Cochrane (1999) or Epstein and Zin
(1989) preferences and stochastic volatility as in Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) struggle to
jointly account for ERRP and excess bond premia. Our findings point towards an explanation
based on currency crashes due to rare disasters (Gabaix, 2012; Farhi and Gabaix, 2016).
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 reprises empirical evidence on UIP at different
horizons and introduces our two-country preference-free theoretical environment. Section 3
highlights the role of the relative yield curve slope in explaining ERRP and business cycle risk.
Section 4 extends the analysis to account for liquidity yields. Section 5 assesses how exchange
rate dynamics change around yield curve inversions, and section 6 concludes.
2 UIP Puzzle Redux
In this section, we first define notation, then summarise the empirical performance of UIP at
different horizons, interpreting UIP failures through the lens of a preference-free setting.
7Notably, in a segmented markets explanation, the pricing kernel for bonds and exchange rates does not
necessarily coincide with the pricing kernel on other assets—such as equity—allowing for the possibility of specific
bond and foreign exchange dynamics.
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2.1 Notation
We set up an environment in which there are two countries—Home and Foreign (the latter
denoted by an asterisk)—each with a representative investor. We maintain two key assumptions
throughout. First, all investors are risk averse. Second, bonds in each country are priced by
domestic agents. The Home and Foreign SDFs spanning the period t to t + κ are denoted by
Mt,t+κ ≤ 1 and M∗t,t+κ ≤ 1, respectively. We assume that these SDFs satisfy Euler equations
for Home and Foreign κ-period risk-free zero-coupon bonds, with prices Pt,κ ≤ 1 and P ∗t,κ ≤ 1,
respectively:
Pt,κ = Et [Mt,t+1Pt+1,κ−1] (1)
P ∗t,κ = Et
[
M∗t,t+1P
∗
t+1,κ−1
]
(2)
which, by forward iteration usingM
(∗)
t,t+κ ≡
∏κ−1
i=0 M
(∗)
t+i,t+i+1 and the law of iterated expectations,
imply:8
1 = Et [Mt,t+κRt,κ] (3)
1 = Et
[
M∗t,t+κR
∗
t,κ
]
(4)
where R
(∗)
t,κ ≡ 1/P (∗)t,κ ≡ (1 + i(∗)t,κ) ≥ 1 is the gross return on the Home (Foreign) κ-period zero-
coupon bond. Additionally, it is useful to define the pricing kernels V
(∗)
t ≥ 0 that comprise the
SDF as M
(∗)
t,t+κ ≡ V (∗)t+κ/V (∗)t .
When engaging in cross-border asset trade, a risk-averse Home agent with κ-period SDF
Mt,t+κ prices risk-free κ-period Foreign currency-denominated assets according to:
1 = Et
[
Mt,t+κ
Et+κ
Et R
∗
t,κ
]
(5)
where Et is the exchange rate, defined as the Home price of a unit of Foreign currency such that
an increase in Et corresponds to a Home depreciation.
Assuming Et and Mt,t+κ are jointly log-normally distributed, international no-arbitrage re-
quires that the exchange rate satisfies:9
Et [∆
κet+κ] +
1
2
vart (∆
κet+κ) =
(
it,κ − i∗t,κ
)− covt (mt,t+κ,∆κet+κ) (6)
where et ≡ log(Et), ∆κet+κ ≡ et+κ − et, i(∗)t,κ ≡ log(R(∗)t,κ), and mt,t+κ ≡ log(Mt,t+κ). This
expression indicates that expected κ-period exchange rate changes should be proportional to
8Throughout the paper we only consider nominal values, which are what we observe in the data. Since the
SDF is itself nominal, the examples and intuition we present should be interpreted in terms of utility units. If
prices are fixed, movements in valuation are then entirely driven by changes to consumption growth.
9The assumption of log-normality is often relaxed in recent literature, which instead employs a measure of
entropy L(·) instead of variance var(·). This is defined according to Lt(Xt+1) = logEt[Xt+1]−Et log[Xt+1] (see
Backus, Boyarchenko, and Chernov, 2018). For our purposes, the assumption of log-normality yields analytical
results parsimoniously.
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κ-period interest differentials, corrected for the covariance between investors’ SDF and exchange
rate dynamics.10 Were investors risk neutral and absent financial frictions, this covariance term
would drop away and the expression predicts that returns on Home and Foreign assets should
be equated in expectation, correcting for exchange rate valuation effects. In equilibrium, the
ERRP is the average of the ERRP demanded by Home investors on Foreign bonds and Foreign
investors on Home bonds.
2.2 Canonical UIP Regression
Motivated by (6), a large empirical literature has tested UIP by regressing ex post exchange
rate changes on interest rate differentials. Following Chinn and Meredith (2005) and Chinn and
Quayyum (2012), our benchmark empirical framework for testing UIP at different horizions
builds on this canonical regression. Using panel data for a cross-section of countries j over time
t, we estimate a sequence of regressions for each κ-month horizon under assumptions of risk
neutrality and rational expectations:
ej,t+κ − ej,t = β1,κ
(
ij,t,κ − i∗t,κ
)
+ fj,κ + uj,t+κ (7)
where ej,t is the (log) exchange rate of country j vis-a`-vis the base currency at time t, ij,t,κ is
the net κ-period return in country j at time t, i∗t,κ is the equivalent return in the base currency,
fj,κ is a country fixed effect, and uj,t+κ is the disturbance.
Under the null hypothesis of UIP, β1,κ = 1 for all κ > 0.
11 Empirical rejections of UIP at
short to medium horizons—i.e. finding βˆ1,κ 6= 1 in regression (7) for small to medium κ—have
regularly been used to motivate claims that interest rates do not adequately explain exchange
rate dynamics and the ERRP.
Data To estimate our regressions, we use exchange rate and interest rate data for six juris-
dictions with liquid bond markets: Australia (AU), Canada (CA), Switzerland (CH), the euro
area (EA), Japan (JP) and the United Kingdom (UK). Additionally, the United States (US)
acts as the base country, such that our benchmark sample covers G7 currencies.
To capture the term structure of interest rates in each country, we use nominal zero-coupon
government bond yield data of the following maturities: 6, 12, 18, ..., 120 months. Nominal
zero-coupon government bond yield curves are obtained from a combination of sources, including
central banks and Wright (2011), which we detail in Appendix A. Our nominal exchange rate
data is from Datastream, measuring the value of domestic currency price per unit of US dollar.
We explore exchange rate dynamics at horizons that match the available maturities of gov-
ernment bond yields, from 6 to 120 months. We use end-of-month data for the period 1980:01
to 2017:12.12
10The second left-hand side term, 1
2
vart(∆
κet+κ), is a Jensen’s inequality term.
11In addition, fj,κ = 0 for all j and κ > 0.
12As Appendix A documents, our panel of nominal zero-coupon government bond yields is unbalanced, with
different countries entering the sample at different dates.
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Figure 2: Estimated coefficients from canonical UIP regression at different horizons
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Notes: Red crosses denote βˆ1,κ estimates from regression (7). The horizontal axis denotes the horizon κ in
months. Regressions estimated using pooled monthly data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY
and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD from 1980:01 to 2017:12, including country fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals,
calculated using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, are denoted by red bars around point estimates.
In the paper’s main body, regressions are estimated using available data over this benchmark
sample, unless otherwise stated. Importantly, however, our main results are robust to splitting
the sample into two sub-periods. First, a pre-global financial crisis period, spanning 1980:01-
2008:06, which excludes the period in which central banks engaged in unconventional monetary
policies. Second, a sample covering the post-crisis period, spanning 1990:01-2017:12, in which
there was a crash in carry trade around 2008 (e.g. Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen, 2009;
Jorda` and Taylor, 2012; Ca’ Zorzi and Marin, 2018) and a switch in UIP coefficients (Bussie`re
et al., 2018). This robustness is an important indicator of the pervasiveness of our results.
Results Figure 2 plots UIP coefficient β1,κ estimates—i.e. loadings on the κ-period interest
rate differential it,κ − i∗t,κ in (7)—from a panel regression with country fixed effects over our
benchmark sample.13 The confidence bands around these point estimates are derived from
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, which correct for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation
and cross-equation correlation.
The coefficient estimates in figure 2 reinforce the view that the UIP hypothesis can be
rejected at short to medium horizons, while the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at longer
13The same results are tabulated in column (1) of table 1, and the adjusted R2 of each regression is plotted in
figure 1.
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horizons. The β1,κ point estimates are significantly below unity at short to medium horizons,
consistent with the UIP puzzle. At the 6 to 36-month horizons, the point estimate is negative,
indicating that high short-term interest rate currencies tend to appreciate, instead of depreciate,
in line with Fama (1984). While, at the 42 and 48-month horizons point estimates are positive
but significantly smaller than unity. Longer-horizon point estimates of β1,κ from regression (7)
tend to be positive and close to unity, corroborating with, inter alia, Chinn and Meredith (2005)
and Chinn and Quayyum (2012).14
2.3 Interpreting the UIP Puzzle
To interpret failures of UIP, we build on the preference-free environment from section 2.1. We
first define the κ-period ex post ERRP at time t as:15
λt,κ ≡ i∗t,κ − it,κ + ∆κet+κ (8)
By assuming that the Foreign agent undertakes a similar optimisation when purchasing
Home assets to the Home investors purchasing Foreign—equation (5)—standard empirical meth-
ods provide evidence on the following ex post equilibrium ERRP (Engel, 2014):
λt,κ = −covt
(
mt,t+κ +m
∗
t,t+κ
2
,∆κet+κ
)
(9)
This equilibrium ERRP reflects the covariance of the cross-country average SDF for the period
t to t+ κ with corresponding horizon exchange rate dynamics.
Our point estimates, consistent with the literature, show that at short and medium horizons,
where βˆ1,κ < 1, high interest rate currencies tend to depreciate insufficiently (and sometimes
appreciate) relative to the UIP benchmark, implying covt(λt,κ, it,κ − i∗t,κ) < 0. In periods when
the Home interest rate is relatively high it,κ > i
∗
t,κ, the ex post ERRP on Foreign currency is
negative λt,κ < 0 resulting in an excess appreciation. The opposite is true in periods where
it,κ < i
∗
t,κ.
16
Cast in a general equilibrium framework, these dynamics imply that the ERRP acts to lower
the risk for Home agents when holding Foreign bonds, since their effective return is relatively
high when investors value returns most. A low Home interest rate it,κ < i
∗
t,κ, via the domestic
bond-pricing Euler equations (3) and (4), is associated with a relatively high valuation of returns
in t+ κ by Home investors, (Et[mt,t+κ] > Et[m
∗
t,t+κ]).
For illustration, suppose that, while it,2 = i
∗
t,2, some disturbance results in a drop of the
Home short term interest rate it,1 < i
∗
t,1. As already mentioned, by the Euler equations (3)
and (4), it must be the case that Et[mt,t+1] > Et[m
∗
t,t+1], while Et[mt,t+2] = Et[m
∗
t,t+2]—note
14The broadly upward sloping relationship between β1,κ coefficient estimates and horizon κ is also apparent in
country-specific regressions, reported in Appendix B.1.
15The ex ante ERRP is defined analogously, with the expectations operator: λ˜t,κ ≡ i∗t,κ − it,κ +Et [∆κet+κ].
16To see this, note that (7) can be substituted into the definition of the ERRP (9) to yield λt,κ = (β1,κ −
1)(it,κ − i∗t,κ), where other terms in the regression have been suppressed for simplicity.
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Figure 3: Illustrative path of ERRP λt,κ around a transitory exchange rate depreciation for
representative Home investor, with it,1 < i
∗
t,1 and it,2 = i
∗
t,2
 t  t+1  t+2
Time  t+ , where  is Horizon
 
t,
 e0 determined and news about mt , t+1
that this could arise from an anticipated transitory monetary policy or shock to consumption.17
Under either scenario, Home investors will value one unit of Home currency at time t+ 1, more
than Foreign investors value a unit of Foreign currency over the same horizon. Now, from
the data, we know that covt(λt,κ, it,κ − i∗t,κ) < 0: in our example, the ERRP implied by this
observation first depreciates the domestic currency at t+ 1, then appreciates it from time t+ 1
to t + 2—i.e. E0 = E2 < E1. The effect is illustrated in Figure 3, with a tent-like shape. From
the vantage point of the Home investor, who holds both Home and Foreign bonds (both Euler
equations hold), the depreciation increases the t + 1 return from the Foreign bond in Home-
currency terms, reallocating resources intertemporally—both from t to t+1 (over which horizon
the Home currency is expected to depreciate), and from t+ 2 to t+ 1 (by virtue of the currency
appreciation). In light of this interpretation of the empirical evidence, the residents in the low
(high) yield country, who have a relatively high (low) nearer-term valuation of returns, can
expect an excess depreciation (appreciation) relative to UIP, such that the ERRP reallocates
returns to investors who value them the most.
However, the spot yield differential only captures part of the incentive for intertemporal
reallocation of returns. Since the shock we consider is transitory, and as we show in Section
3.2 only transitory shocks are relevant for our mechanism, the equilibrium depreciation at t+ 1
depends on the path of future valuations {m(∗)t+κ−1,t+κ}κ=1,2,...,∞ which govern the losses from a
subsequent expected appreciation, and is captured by the term structure of interest rates. The
role of the term structure in ERRP determination is the central message of this paper and we
develop this relationship in section 3.
Importantly, this mechanism does not hinge on the assumed degree of financial market
completeness. Under complete markets (CM), the exchange rate is uniquely given by E[et+κ]−
17For example, Benigno, Benigno, and Nistico` (2012) show that to a first order in a large general equilibrium
model, keeping the real rate fixed and under flexible prices, Et[mt,t+1] = −pit where pit is the inflation rate and
is determined as the sum of an inflation target and monetary policy shocks.
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et = m
∗
t,t+κ −mt,t+κ, so the ERRP collapses to:
λCMt,κ =
1
2
[vart(mt,t+κ)− vart(m∗t,t+κ)] (10)
The CM paradigm is a useful benchmark because it provides a determinate model for ex-
change rate dynamics without the need to specify the nature of shock processes affecting the
economy.18 Time variation in the risk premium therefore requires volatility to be stochastic, an
issue we revisit in section 5.2. If markets are incomplete, for any given pair of Home and Foreign
SDFs, the exchange rate process is not uniquely determined, although the complete markets
outcome above remains an admissible equilibrium (Backus, Foresi, and Telmer, 2001). Another,
more general, admissible exchange rate process under market incompleteness can be written as
E[et+κ] − et = m∗t,t+κ − mt,t+κ + ηt,t+κ, where ηt,t+κ encapsulates non-trade risk (Lustig and
Verdelhan, 2019). In this case the risk premium is given by:19
λIMt,κ =
1
2
[vart(mt,t+κ)− var(m∗t,t+κ) + covt(mt,t+κ +m∗t,t+κ, ηt,t+κ)] (11)
While more realistic, this formulation is less tractable and requires assumptions on the covari-
ance on non-traded risk and the SDFs.
3 UIP and the Yield Curve
In this section, we demonstrate that currencies with relatively steep yield curves tend to depre-
ciate most strongly at business cycle horizons. We extend our preference-free setup to interpret
this finding for ERRP, attributing it to business cycle risk that is captured in domestic yield
curves because they contain information on transitory variation in SDFs.
3.1 Yield Curve-Augmented UIP Regression
To study how information in the yield curve, over and above spot interest rate differentials,
matters for exchange rate determination, we augment regression (7) with measures of the relative
yield curve slope Sj,t − S∗t and relative yield curve curvature Cj,t − C∗t . For all κ, we estimate
the extended panel regression:
ej,t+κ − ej,t = β1,κ
(
ij,t,κ − i∗t,κ
)
+ β2,κ(Sj,t − S∗t ) + β3,κ(Cj,t − C∗t ) + fj,κ + uj,t+κ (12)
where Sj,t (Cj,t) is the slope (curvature) of the country j yield curve at time t and S
∗
t (C
∗
t ) is
the slope (curvature) of the base country yield curve.
We use the yield curve slope and curvature in our extended regression to capture information
in the yield curve in a parsimonious way. Along with the yield curve level, the yield curve slope
18Note that this is an assumption on cross-country markets and does not impose any restrictions on the time
series of either Home or Foreign SDFs.
19Lustig and Verdelhan (2019) discuss the limits of this approach, subject to the additional assumption that
Mt,t+κ,M
∗
t,t+κ are themselves not affected by market incompleteness.
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and curvature are known to capture a high degree of variation in bond yields (Litterman and
Scheinkman, 1991). We do not include the relative yield curve level in our baseline regression for
two reasons.20 First, we interpret the spot rate differential—the relevant quantity for UIP—as a
proxy for the level.21 Second, by nesting the canonical UIP regression (7) within our regression
framework, the β2,κ and β3,κ coefficients have a dual interpretation in terms of exchange rate
changes and ERRP. Combining (8) with (12), the ex post κ-period ERRP can be expressed as:
λj,t,κ = (β1,κ − 1)
(
ij,t,κ − i∗t,κ
)
+ β2,κ(Sj,t − S∗t ) + β3,κ(Cj,t − C∗t ) + fj,κ + uj,t+κ
Comparing this with (12), then β2,κ can be interpreted as either the average domestic depreci-
ation (in percent) or the average increase in the ERRP (in pp) associated with a 1pp increase
in the slope of the domestic yield curve relative to the US (base) country.
To measure the yield curve slope and curvature, we use proxies. We measure the yield curve
slope as the difference between 10-year and 6-month yields—ij,t,10y and ij,t,6m, respectively—
such that Sj,t = ij,t,10y− ij,t,6m. Our curvature proxy a butterfly spread, a function of 6-month,
5 and 10-year yields (Diebold and Rudebusch, 2013), where ij,t,5y is the 5-year yield, such that
Cj,t = 2ij,t,5y − (ij,t,6m + ij,t,10y). We prefer these measures to principal component estimates of
the yield curve slope and curvature. A principal component measure potentially contains look-
ahead bias, being defined using weights constructed from information in the whole sample. By
construction, our slope proxy is only based on information available up to time t. Nevertheless,
our findings are robust to the definition of yield curve slope and curvature.
Results Our benchmark results for regression (12) are documented in table 1. Columns (2)-
(4) present the β1,κ, β2,κ and β3,κ estimates at different horizons from the panel regression using
pooled monthly data from 1980:01 to 2017:12. For comparison, column (1) includes the β1,κ
estimates from the canonical UIP regression (7). Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
Two observations are particularly noteworthy. First, the broadly upward sloping relation-
ship between the UIP coefficient β1,κ and horizon κ is robust to the augmentation of the UIP
regression with the relative yield curve slope and curvature. This reflects a reasonably low
correlation between spot yield differentials, and the relative slope and curvature, respectively.22
Importantly, this implies that the additional contribution of relative yield curve slope and cur-
vature can be interpreted over and above the role for spot interest rate differentials, as an
additional component of the ERRP.
20The exclusion of the yield curve level marks an important difference between our empirical framework and
that of Chen and Tsang (2013).
21The yield curve level is often proxied by a specific bond yield—often the 10-year rate.
22To a large extent, this low correlation is driven by the approximate orthogonality of each country’s yield
curve level, slope and curvature proxies. This is the case because the proxies approximate factors constructed
using principal components analysis, which are orthogonal by definition. Although the regressions do not include
the relative level of the yield curve, the κ-period interest rate differential is likely to include similar information.
Therefore, it is somewhat unsurprising that the inclusion of the relative yield curve slope and curvature only
minimally affect point estimates of β1,κ.
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Table 1: Coefficient estimates from canonical UIP regression and regression augmented with
relative yield curve slope and curvature
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Maturity UIP Regression Yield Curve Augmented Regression
κ iκ − i∗κ iκ − i∗κ S − S∗ C − C∗
6-months -1.06 -0.40 0.75 -0.61
(0.65) (1.00) (0.70) (0.74)
12-months -0.99** -0.22 1.41 -0.82
(0.50) (0.82) (1.14) (1.09)
18-months -0.87** 0.29 2.87** -1.25
(0.43) (0.69) (1.31) (1.23)
24-months -0.67* 0.60 4.31*** -2.45
(0.39) (0.62) (1.50) (1.53)
30-months -0.47 0.94* 5.98*** -3.67**
(0.35) (0.56) (1.60) (1.77)
36-months -0.25 1.11** 6.74*** -4.13**
(0.33) (0.52) (1.63) (1.74)
42-months 0.05 1.31*** 7.40*** -5.11***
(0.33) (0.44) (1.61) (1.86)
48-months 0.35 1.39*** 7.04*** -4.89**
(0.31) (0.35) (1.68) (2.03)
54-months 0.67** 1.53*** 6.63*** -4.51**
(0.28) (0.28) (1.83) (2.20)
60-months 0.90*** 1.60*** 5.98*** -3.66
(0.25) (0.27) (1.97) (2.31)
66-months 1.11*** 1.64*** 4.91** -2.06
(0.23) (0.26) (2.03) (2.37)
72-months 1.27*** 1.64*** 3.61* -0.52
(0.19) (0.23) (1.93) (2.21)
78-months 1.31*** 1.55*** 2.54 -0.06
(0.17) (0.21) (1.77) (2.09)
84-months 1.27*** 1.42*** 1.89 -0.30
(0.17) (0.19) (1.65) (2.10)
90-months 1.20*** 1.28*** 0.93 0.32
(0.17) (0.18) (1.60) (2.07)
96-months 1.08*** 1.10*** -0.06 0.90
(0.17) (0.16) (1.68) (2.24)
102-months 0.94*** 0.93*** -0.41 0.63
(0.17) (0.16) (1.74) (2.25)
108-months 0.81*** 0.78*** -0.71 0.25
(0.17) (0.16) (1.83) (2.31)
114-months 0.73*** 0.70*** -0.88 0.20
(0.17) (0.16) (1.89) (2.50)
120-months 0.68*** 0.65*** -0.42 -0.79
(0.16) (0.16) (1.66) (2.34)
Notes: Column (1) presents coefficient estimates from regression (7)—the canonical UIP regression—
a regression of the κ-period exchange rate change ∆κet+κ on the κ-period interest rate differential
it,κ− i∗t,κ. Columns (2)-(4) document point estimates from (12)—the augmented regression—using the
relative yield curve slope and curvature (measured using proxies) as additional regressors. Regressions
are estimated using pooled end-of-month data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and
GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD from 1980:01 to 2017:12, including country fixed effects. The panel is unbal-
anced. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels, respectively, using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors (reported in parentheses).
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Figure 4: Estimated relative slope coefficients from augmented UIP regression
-5
0
5
10
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120
Horizon (in months)
With Slope & Curvature
Notes: Black circles denote βˆ2,κ point estimates from regression (12). The horizontal axis denotes the horizon κ
in months. In regression (12), the slope and curvature in each country are measured using proxies. Regressions
are estimated using pooled monthly data from 1980:01 to 2017:12, including country fixed effects. 95% confidence
intervals, calculated using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, are denoted by thick black bars around
point estimates.
Second, and most importantly, our point estimates of β2,κ reveal a tent-shaped relationship
with respect to horizon κ between the relative yield curve slope and κ-period exchange rate
dynamics. Figure 4 shows this visually, plotting β2,κ coefficient estimates with respect to the
horizon κ. Coefficients on the slope differential are insignificantly different from zero at short
horizons, but increase in sign and significance from short to medium horizons. In figure 4, the
βˆ2,κ coefficient peaks at the 3.5-year horizon, quantitatively indicating that a one percentage
point increase in a country’s relative yield curve slope relative to the US is, on average, associated
with a 7.40% exchange rate depreciation over that horizon. At longer horizons—from 6.5-years
onwards—the loading on the relative yield curve slope is insignificantly different from zero.
In Appendix B.2, we explore the robustness of this benchmark result. First, we assess the
significance of our coefficient estimates using more conservative standard errors. In the main
body of the paper, we report Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors, which are robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation—an important consideration given that the error terms
in forecasting regressions like (7) are moving average processes of order κ− 1 by construction.
However, for the longer horizon variants of (7), where the number of non-overlapping observa-
tions can be limited, size distortions—i.e. the null hypothesis being rejected too often—are a
pertinent concern, especially with small samples and persistent regressors (Valkanov, 2003). To
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carry out more conservative inference, we draw on Moon, Rubia, and Valkanov (2004), who pro-
pose the scaling of t-statistics by 1/
√
κ, showing that these scaled t-statistics are approximately
standard normal when regressors are highly persistent.23 Using the more conservative scaled
t-statistics, our primary result—the tent-shaped pattern for β2,κ estimates with respect to hori-
zon κ—remains significant. However, the contribution of the relative curve is insignificant at
all horizons. Second, we demonstrate that our findings are robust to sample period choice. In
particular, the coefficients on the relative slope remain significant and tent-shaped with respect
to maturity when the sample is ended in 2008:06, to omit the crisis and post-crisis period.
Third, we show that the tent-shaped pattern for the loading on the relative slope broadly holds
at a country level, by separately estimating (7) and (12) for each of our six currencies vis-a`-vis
the USD.
3.2 Interpreting the Role of the Yield Curve
These results imply that the relative yield curve slope plays an economically and statistically
significant role in explaining future exchange rate movements at business cycle horizons espe-
cially. To interpret these findings, we argue that the depreciation associated with a having a
relatively steep slope is consistent with the low-risk asset dynamics for the exchange rate we
described in section 2.3, reflecting a business cycle risk component of ERRP.
Yield Curve Slopes A first key building block for this interpretation is an understanding of
yield curve slopes within a closed economy setting. For a Home agent investing in an n-period
Home bond, the relevant Euler equation (3) can be rewritten as:
1
Rt,n
= Et
[
n−1∏
i=0
Mt+i,t+i+1
]
(13)
Defining the (log) excess return from buying an n-period bond at time t for price Pt,n = 1/Rt,n
and selling it at time t+ 1 for Pt+1,n−1 = 1/Rt+1,n−1 as rxt+1,n = pt+1,n−1 − pt,n − yt,1, where
pt,n ≡ log(Pt,n) and yt,n ≡ − 1npt,n is the annualised yield on an n-period bond,24 then Piazzesi
and Schneider (2007) show that
Et [rxt+1,n] = −covt
(
mt,t+1,Et+1
n−1∑
i=1
mt+i,t+i+1
)
− 1
2
vart (pt+1,n−1) (14)
Here, the covariance term on the right-hand side is the risk premium on bonds. The variance
term reflects Jensen’s inequality. It implies that the risk premium on an n-period domestic
bond is given by the covariance of today’s one-period SDF with the sum of all future one-period
SDFs from time t + 1 to t + n. The risk premium is positive if today’s one-period SDF is
23Because this is an approximate result, these standard errors are not our preferred metric of inference. Indeed,
the scaled t-statistics tend to under-reject the null when regressors are not near-integrated, implying that these
confidence bands offer the most conservative inference for our regressions.
24The annualised yield yt,n and the n-period return it,n have the following relationship: nyt,n = it,n.
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negatively correlated with expected changes in future marginal utility. That is, if households
receive good news about the distant future and, as a consequence, value consumption less at
this horizon—i.e. lower Et [mt+i,t+i+1] for some i > 0—they will value consumption relatively
highly in the near-term—i.e. higher mt,t+1.
Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) further note that, over long enough samples, the average
excess return on an n-period bond is approximately equal to the average yield curve slope,
defined as the spread between the n-period yield and the short rate, St ≡ yt,n − yt,1, so:25
St ≈ −covt
(
mt,t+1,Et+1
n−1∑
i=1
mt+i,t+i+1
)
(15)
where the right-hand-most Jensen’s inequality term in (14) has been suppressed. As a result,
the yield curve will be upward sloping on average if the right-hand side of (14) is positive.
In turn, the fact we empirically see yield curves slope upwards on average indicates that the
covariance of today’s one period SDF with the sum of all future one-period SDFs from time
t+ 1 to t+ n is indeed negative.
Extending (15) to our general international asset pricing framework indicates that the rela-
tive cross-country yield curve slope, SR ≡ S − S∗, can be interpreted as the difference between
investors’ SDF autocovariance.
ERRP and Transitory Risk To assess and interpret the driver of the relationship between
the relative yield curve slope and exchange rate dynamics, we consider the following decompo-
sition of pricing kernels Vt, proposed in Alvarez and Jermann (2005):
Vt = V
T
t V
P
t
for all t, where V Tt is a component with only transitory innovations and V
P
t is a component
with permanent innovations which follows a martingale.26 A variable X is defined as having
only transitory innovations if:
lim
κ→∞
Et+1[Xt+κ]
Et[Xt+κ]
= 1
We interpret transitory innovations to the pricing kernel as business cycle risk. Although Alvarez
and Jermann (2005) show that most SDF volatility is attributable to permanent innovations,
Lustig et al. (2019) show that the cross-country difference in permanent SDF volatility must be
25To see this, re-write the excess return rxt+1,n as
pt+1,n−1 − pt,n − yt,1 = nyt,n − (n− 1)yt+1,n−1 − yt,1
= yt,n − yt,1 − (n− 1)(yt+1,n−1 − yt,n)
Over a long enough sample and with large n, the difference between the average (n − 1)-period yield and the
average n-period yield is zero implying that Et [rxt+1,n] ≈ yt,n − yt,1 ≡ St.
26Formally V Tt = limκ→∞
δt+κ
Pt,κ
where δ is a constant chosen to satisfy 0 < limκ→∞
Pt,κ
δκ
< ∞ for all t. Given
this V Pt = limκ→∞
Pt,κ
δt+κ
Vt = limκ→∞
Et [Vt+κ]
δt+κ
.
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zero. In the limit, the ERRP is given by:
lim
κ→∞Et[λt+κ] =
1
2
[
vart(ν
P
t+1)− vart(νP∗t+1)
]
(16)
where ν
(∗)
t ≡ log(V P(∗)t ).27 To reconcile empirical UIP deviations with theory at both short and
long horizons under the complete markets benchmark (10), we require that high-rate currencies
have relatively less volatile transitory pricing kernels (vart(ν
T(∗)
t )), while the volatilities of the
permanent components are similar. This is a key motivation for our main empirical exercise
since transitory movements in SDFs, in contrast to permanent ones, are captured by the term
structure of risk free yields as we illustrate in the examples below.
Exchange rate dynamics appear to characterise an equilibrium adjustment described in sec-
tion 2.3, reallocating returns intertemporally to investors with the highest valuation of returns.
If innovations were permanent, investors have no incentive to reallocate consumption intertem-
porally since the relative valuation over time is unchanged. Consequently, the mechanism we
describe is specific to transitory innovations, which we interpret as business cycle fluctuations.
Transitory innovations to the pricing kernel are relevant for exchange rate dynamics and carry
most explanatory power at 3 to 5-year horizons. Consequently, the future path of SDFs, as
captured by the term structure of the yield curves, is key to understanding exchange rate dy-
namics. We now present analytical examples explicitly relating variation in ERRP and the
cross-country yield curve slope differential.
Example 1 (First-Order Autrogressive Pricing Kernel) Let the (log) Home (Foreign)
pricing kernel ν
(∗)
t follow an AR(1) process ν
(∗)
t = ρ
(∗)
ν ν
(∗)
t−1 + ε
(∗)
ν,t , where ε
(∗)
ν,t ∼ N
(
0, σ
(∗)
ν
)
,
ρν = ρ
∗
ν ∈ (0, 1) and σ(∗)ν > 0. Under complete markets, the ERRP (10) can be written
λt,κ =
1
2
ρ2(κ−1)ν
[
vart (νt+1)− vart
(
ν∗t+1
)]
(17)
and, using (15), the relative yield curve slope can (approximately) be written as:
SRt ≡ St − S∗t =
(
1− ρ(n−1)ν
) [
vart (νt+1)− vart
(
ν∗t+1
)]
(18)
Combining (17) and (18) yields the following relationship between the empirical ERRP and the
relative yield curve slope:
λt,κ =
1
2
ρ
2(κ−1)
ν
1− ρ(n−1)ν
SRt . (19)
The AR(1) structure delivers analytical simplicity and ρν ∈ (0, 1) ensures a positive yield
curve slope, a salient empirical feature on average. Figure 5 demonstrates the strength of the
relationship between ERRP λt,κ, across horizons κ, and the relative slope S
R for an example
where ρν = 0.9. This parameterisation delivers a simulated first-order SDF autocorrelation
27Lustig et al. (2019) derive this as the conditional dollar term premium on an infinite-maturity bond, but in
the limit the two risk premia are equivalent, as we discuss in section 3.3.
18
of around −0.02, close to the lower bound identified in Chre´tien (2012). In this case, and all
instances where ρν ∈ (0, 1) such that yield curves slope upward for this AR(1) example, there is a
positive relationship between the ERRP and the relative slope, declining as κ increases.28 In the
case of ρ
(∗)
ν = 1, the SDF is a martingale and only has permanent innovations, νt = ν
P
t and the
yield curve in each country is flat. In the case of ρ
(∗)
ν = 0, the pricing kernel is i.i.d and contains
no information on ERRP. Consequently, consistent with our reasoning, the explanatory power
of the relative yield curve slope on the ERRP originates from predictable transitory innovations
to pricing kernels which can reflect business cycle risk.
Example 2 (Second-Order Autrogressive Pricing Kernel) Let the (log) Home (Foreign)
pricing kernel ν
(∗)
t follow an AR(2) process ν
(∗)
t = ρ
(∗)
1,νν
(∗)
t−1 + ρ
(∗)
2,νν
(∗)
t−2 + ε
(∗)
ν,t , where ε
(∗)
ν,t ∼
N
(
0, σ
(∗)
ν
)
, ρ1,ν = ρ
∗
1,ν , ρ2,ν = ρ
∗
2,ν and σ
(∗)
ν > 0. Let ψi denote the coefficients that result
from the conversion of an AR(2) process to an MA(∞) using the Wold decomposition theorem.
Under complete markets, the ERRP (10) can be written
λt,κ =
1
2
ψ2κ−1
[
vart (νt+1)− vart
(
ν∗t+1
)]
(20)
and, using (15), the relative yield curve slope can (approximately) be written as:
SRt ≡ St − S∗t = (1− ψn−1)
[
vart (νt+1)− vart
(
ν∗t+1
)]
(21)
Combining (20) and (21) yields the following relationship between the empirical ERRP and the
relative yield curve slope:
λt,κ =
1
2
ψ2κ−1
1− ψn−1S
R
t . (22)
This example is able to capture both the positive sign of the relationship between ERRP
and the relative slope, and the tent-shaped relationship with respect to horizon κ under certain
restrictions on the parameters ψi.
29
To demonstrate the tent-shaped relationship, figure 5 plots the relative size of coefficients
linking the ERRP λt,κ and the relative slope S
R
t across horizons in equations (19) and (22),
respectively. To highlight horizon-variation in the relationship, we normalise both lines by the
maximum factor across horizons, such that the peak normalised relationship is unity. The
parameters are chosen to ensure the autoregressive processes are mean-reverting and, thus,
capture the transitory component of the pricing kernel. In the AR(2) case, the strength of the
relationship between the ERRP and the relative slope increases over short horizons, because
with ρ1,ν > 1 innovations to the pricing kernel at time t have larger effects on subsequent pricing
kernels than the contemporaneous one. Thereafter, as the horizon grows, a ρ2,ν < 0 ensures
that the second-order term begins to dominate, ensuring the relationship approaches zero at
28See Appendix C.2 for a full derivation of Example 1.
29See Appendix C.3 for a full derivation of Example 2 and discussion of required parameter restrictions for a
tent-shaped relationship.
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Figure 5: Relationship between exchange rate risk premium λt,κ and relative yield curve slope
St − S∗t in examples 1 and 2
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Notes: Plot of implied relationship between λt,κ and S
R
t in examples 1 and 2, normalised such that the peak
relationship is unity. For the AR(1) process (Example 1), the persistence parameter calibration is ρν = 0.9. For
the AR(2) process (Example 2), the calibration is: ρ1 = 1.7 and ρ2 = −0.75.
long horizons.30
Intuitively, if the yield curve of a country is upward sloping on average, the valuation of
returns in the short run is high relative to the future, as reflected by a negative autocovariance
of consumption.31 The representative investor wants to reallocate returns to the short run. We
have shown both empirically, and independently in a theoretical example, that the difference in
the incentive to reallocate returns intertemporally across countries, as captured by the relative
slope, is a strong predictor of exchange rate movements at numerous horizons.
3.3 Recasting the Slope: Holding Period Returns
Our empirical analysis in section 3.1 has the advantage of nesting the benchmark UIP regression
and, in turn, allows simultaneous interpretation of the relationship between the relative yield
curve slope and exchange rate dynamics, as well as with the ERRP. However, two pertinent
concerns around the empirical framework remain, which we address in this subsection.
The first concern is conceptual. In section 3.1, we assume that investors hold Home and
Foreign bonds to maturity, investigating returns to each bonds’ maturity. In reality, investors
may not hold bonds to maturity, with bond holding periods h falling short of bond maturity
κ. As a consequence, in a risk-neutral environment there would be a whole set of no-abitrage
conditions, for bonds of different maturities over varying holding periods.
30In this example, the first-order autocorrelation of the SDF is positive, but medium-horizon SDF autocorrela-
tions turn negative as the tent-shaped relationship turns downward. Although Chre´tien (2012) shows empirical
evidence that the first-order autocorrelation of SDFs is small but negative, this finding might be driven by the
permanent component of SDFs. In our application, the yield curve slope captures only the transitory SDF
component.
31Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) argue that the upward sloping yield curve can also suggest bad news about
future inflation, particularly in the early 1980s. However, the covariance between consumption growth and
inflation driving this interpretation in insignificant in recent sub-samples. Additionally, yield curve on inflation-
indexed securities also tend to slope upwards, on average.
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The second concern is empirical. Because regression (12) is based on ex post exchange rate
outcomes, the sample of available observations diminishes as bond maturity κ increases. More-
over, the number of available non-overlapping observations also diminishes, posing additional
challenges for inference. Although our benchmark analyses relies on standard errors that are
robust to the serial correlation that overlapping observations result in, these two concerns can
be further addressed by assessing the returns on bonds of a given maturity κ over different
holding periods h. Doing this both acts as an additional robustness exercise to underpin our
benchmark results, but also allows us to investigate whether price dynamics originate from bond
permia or the currency premium, extending the findings in Lustig et al. (2019).32
Additional Notation We distinguish a bond’s maturity κ > 0 from its holding period h > 0,
where h ≤ κ and h = κ if and only if a bond is held until maturity. The h-period holding period
return on a κ-period zero-coupon bond is HPR
(κ)
t,t+h = Pt+h,κ−h/Pt,κ, i.e. the ratio of the bond’s
resale price at time t + h when its maturity has diminished by h periods relative to its time t
price. The (log) excess return on that bond over that holding period h is thus
rx
(κ)
t,t+h = log
HPR(κ)t,t+h
Rt,h
 (23)
where, from section 2.1, Rt,h is the gross return on an h-period zero-coupon bond at time t, i.e.
the risk-free rate.
The h-period (log) return on a domestic κ-period bond position, expressed in units of USD
(the base currency), in excess of the risk-free return in the base currency, rx
(κ),$
t,t+h, can be written:
rx
(κ),$
t,t+h = log
HPR(κ)t,t+h
R∗t,h
Et
Et+h
 = log
HPR(κ)t,t+h
Rt,h
+ log [Rt,h
R∗t,h
Et
Et+h
]
≡ rx(κ)t,t+h + rxFXt,t+h (24)
where the rxFXt+h following the last equality represents the (log) currency excess return, defined
relative to (8) as rxFXt,t+h ≡ −λt,h. In addition, the limiting relationship between currency excess
returns and the per period return on infinite-maturity bonds, as shown in Alvarez and Jermann
(2005) and Lustig et al. (2019), is:
lim
κ→∞−
1
κ
Et[rx
FX
t,t+κ] = limκ→∞
1
κ
Et[λt,κ] = λ
(∞)
t,1
Empirical Setup Using the above definitions, we estimate the following panel regressions for
different holding periods h and bond maturities κ:
yj,t,h = γ1,h (Sj,t − S∗t ) + fj,h + εj,t+h (25)
32Given that our dependent variable remains an ex post return, non-overlapping observations are not completely
removed. But the share of non-overlapping observations in each sample does increase, even when assessing 5-year
holding period returns on 10-year maturity bonds.
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where the dependent variable yj,t,h is either the excess return on the Home bond in USD relative
to the US return rx
(κ),$
j,t,t+h − rx(κ)US,t,t+h (the ‘dollar-bond return’ difference), the excess return
from Home currency rxFXj,t,t+h, or the excess return on the Home bond in Home currency units
relative to the US return rx
(κ)
j,t,t+h − rx(κ)US,t,t+h (the ‘local currency-bond return’ difference).
Compared to the results in section 3.1, the γ1,h coefficients have a slightly different in-
terpretation to β2,κ. β2,κ can be interpreted as the average increase in the ERRP for Home
investors associated with a 1pp increase in the slope of the Home yield curve relative to the US
(base) country. Given rxFXt,t+h = −λHt,h, then the interpretation of γ1,h is reversed: −γ1,h can be
interpreted in a similar way to β2,κ when yj,t,h = rx
FX
k,t,t+h.
Equation (24) also indicates that the dollar-bond excess return is equal to the sum of the
local currency-bond and currency excess returns, rx
(κ),$
t,t+h = rx
(κ)
t,t+h + rx
FX
t,t+h. Focusing on h = 1
and κ = 120 only, Lustig et al. (2019) show that the relative yield curve slope has an insignificant
influence on rx
(κ),$
t,t+h, but opposing effects on rx
(κ)
t,t+h (positive coefficient) and rx
FX
t,t+h (negative
coefficient) which cancel out for the dollar-bond excess return overall. Our empirical framework
extends on this, assessing the predictability of excess returns with yield curve slope differentials
at a range of maturities κ and holding periods h, bridging the gap between our results in section
3.1 and those of Lustig et al. (2019).
Results The results are presented in table 2 and 3. Importantly, where our regression spec-
ification most closely matches Lustig et al. (2019), at short-holding periods h = 6 and long
maturity κ = 120, our results mirror theirs.33 The slope exerts an insignificant effect on the
dollar-bond risk premium difference, a positive and significant influence on the local currency-
bond risk premium difference rx
(120)
j,t,t+6 − rx(120)US,t,t+6, and a negative and significant influence on
the currency risk premium rxFXj,t,t+6, with the latter two effects similar in magnitude such that
they cancel out for rx
(120),$
j,t,t+6 − rx(120)US,t,t+6.34
More generally, exploring our results at all holding periods h and for all maturities κ, two
observations are noteworthy.35
First, for a given maturity, the loading on the relative slope exhibits a tent shape across
holding periods for both the currency risk premium and the dollar-bond risk premium difference.
Although significant at shorter holding periods, the relative slope loadings are quantitatively
small for local currency-bond risk premia differences and are dominated by its loadings on
currency excess returns in explaining the relative slope’s impact on dollar-bond risk premia
differences. This supports the findings from our benchmark augmented UIP regression in section
3.1. A steep domestic yield curve is associated with a higher ERRP for Home investors and,
in turn, a higher excess return on Home bonds in US dollar units, dominating the influence of
33Formally, Lustig et al. (2019) consider a 1-month holding period, so comparison is not exact.
34More generally, the short-horizon local-currency bond return difference predictability confirm results for US
bond returns documents by Fama and Bliss (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005).
35In Appendix B.3, we present average returns across maturities κ and holding periods h from dynamic invest-
ment strategies that involve going long the Home bond and short the US bond when the Home yield curve slope
is lower than the US yield curve slope, and vice versa.
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Table 2: Slope coefficient estimates from pooled regression of excess returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Holding Periods
6m 12m 18m 24m 30m 36m 42m 48m 54m 60m
Panel A: Dependent Variable: rx
(κ),$
j,t,t+h − rx
(κ)
US,t,t+h, Coefficient on S − S∗
12m -1.74***
(0.38)
18m -1.63*** -2.17***
(0.37) (0.56)
24m -1.52*** -2.09*** -2.75***
(0.36) (0.54) (0.66)
30m -1.42*** -2.02*** -2.71*** -3.00***
(0.36) (0.53) (0.65) (0.73)
36m -1.32*** -1.94*** -2.66*** -2.99*** -3.32***
(0.36) (0.53) (0.63) (0.72) (0.75)
42m -1.21*** -1.86*** -2.60*** -2.97*** -3.32*** -3.38***
(0.36) (0.52) (0.62) (0.71) (0.74) (0.76)
48m -1.11*** -1.77*** -2.54*** -2.94*** -3.31*** -3.39*** -3.06***
(0.37) (0.51) (0.61) (0.70) (0.73) (0.75) (0.85)
54m -1.00*** -1.68*** -2.46*** -2.90*** -3.28*** -3.38*** -3.07*** -2.53**
(0.37) (0.51) (0.60) (0.69) (0.73) (0.75) (0.84) (1.00)
60m -0.90** -1.59*** -2.39*** -2.85*** -3.25*** -3.36*** -3.07*** -2.54** -1.95*
(0.38) (0.51) (0.60) (0.68) (0.72) (0.74) (0.83) (0.99) (1.12)
66m -0.80** -1.50*** -2.31*** -2.79*** -3.21*** -3.34*** -3.05*** -2.54** -1.95* -1.53
(0.39) (0.51) (0.59) (0.68) (0.71) (0.73) (0.82) (0.98) (1.11) (1.23)
72m -0.71* -1.42*** -2.24*** -2.74*** -3.17*** -3.31*** -3.03*** -2.53*** -1.95* -1.53
(0.39) (0.50) (0.58) (0.67) (0.71) (0.73) (0.82) (0.97) (1.10) (1.22)
78m -0.61 -1.33*** -2.17*** -2.68*** -3.12*** -3.27*** -3.00*** -2.51*** -1.95* -1.53
(0.40) (0.50) (0.58) (0.66) (0.70) (0.72) (0.81) (0.97) (1.10) (1.22)
84m -0.55 -1.26** -2.11*** -2.63*** -3.07*** -3.22*** -2.97*** -2.49*** -1.93* -1.52
(0.41) (0.50) (0.57) (0.66) (0.70) (0.72) (0.81) (0.96) (1.09) (1.21)
90m -0.45 -1.19** -2.04*** -2.57*** -3.02*** -3.18*** -2.93*** -2.46** -1.91* -1.51
(0.41) (0.50) (0.57) (0.66) (0.69) (0.71) (0.80) (0.95) (1.08) (1.20)
96m -0.37 -1.12** -1.98*** -2.52*** -2.97*** -3.13*** -2.89*** -2.43** -1.89* -1.50
(0.42) (0.50) (0.57) (0.65) (0.69) (0.71) (0.80) (0.95) (1.08) (1.20)
102m -0.29 -1.05** -1.92*** -2.47*** -2.92*** -3.09*** -2.85*** -2.40** -1.87* -1.48
(0.42) (0.50) (0.57) (0.65) (0.68) (0.71) (0.79) (0.94) (1.07) (1.19)
108m -0.22 -0.99* -1.86*** -2.42*** -2.87*** -3.04*** -2.81*** -2.36** -1.84* -1.46
(0.43) (0.51) (0.56) (0.65) (0.68) (0.70) (0.79) (0.94) (1.06) (1.19)
114m -0.15 -0.92* -1.81*** -2.37*** -2.82*** -2.99*** -2.76*** -2.32** -1.82* -1.44
(0.43) (0.51) (0.56) (0.64) (0.68) (0.70) (0.79) (0.94) (1.06) (1.18)
120m -0.08 -0.86* -1.75*** -2.32*** -2.77*** -2.95*** -2.72*** -2.29** -1.79* -1.42
(0.44) (0.51) (0.56) (0.64) (0.67) (0.70) (0.78) (0.93) (1.05) (1.18)
Panel B: Dependent Variable: rxFXj,t,t+h
S-S∗ -1.84*** -2.25*** -2.80*** -3.01*** -3.32*** -3.37*** -3.04*** -2.51** -1.93* -1.52
(0.39) (0.57) (0.67) (0.74) (0.76) (0.77) (0.86) (1.00) (1.13) (1.24)
N 2,326 2,290 2,254 2,218 2,182 2,146 2,110 2,074 2,038 2,002
Notes: Coefficient estimates on the relative yield curve slope St − S∗t from regressions with the log dollar-bond excess return difference
(Panel A) or the h-period log currency excess return (Panel B) as dependent variables. Regressions are estimated using pooled end-of-month
data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD for different samples. The log returns and yield curve
slopes differentials are annualised. All regressions include country fixed effects. The panels are unbalanced and standard errors (reported in
parentheses) are constructed according to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistically significant point
estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Slope coefficient estimates from pooled regression of excess returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Holding Periods
6m 12m 18m 24m 30m 36m 42m 48m 54m 60m
Panel C: Dependent Variable: rx
(κ)
j,t,t+h − rx
(κ)
US,t,t+h
12m 0.09*
(0.05)
18m 0.21** 0.08**
(0.10) (0.04)
24m 0.31** 0.15** 0.05
(0.13) (0.07) (0.03)
30m 0.42** 0.22** 0.09 0.01
(0.17) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03)
36m 0.52*** 0.30** 0.14 0.02 0.00
(0.20) (0.13) (0.09) (0.05) (0.02)
42m 0.62*** 0.39** 0.19* 0.04 0.00 -0.01
(0.23) (0.16) (0.11) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02)
48m 0.73*** 0.48*** 0.26* 0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.25) (0.18) (0.14) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)
54m 0.83*** 0.57*** 0.33** 0.12 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.28) (0.20) (0.15) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)
60m 0.94*** 0.66*** 0.41** 0.16 0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.30) (0.21) (0.17) (0.13) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
66m 1.03*** 0.75*** 0.48*** 0.22 0.11 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.31) (0.22) (0.18) (0.14) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01)
72m 1.13*** 0.83*** 0.56*** 0.27* 0.15 0.07 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.33) (0.24) (0.20) (0.15) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
78m 1.23*** 0.91*** 0.63*** 0.33** 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.34) (0.25) (0.21) (0.17) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)
84m 1.29*** 0.99*** 0.69*** 0.38** 0.25* 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.00
(0.36) (0.26) (0.22) (0.17) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05)
90m 1.39*** 1.06*** 0.76*** 0.44** 0.30** 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.01
(0.37) (0.27) (0.23) (0.18) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06)
96m 1.47*** 1.13*** 0.81*** 0.49** 0.35** 0.24* 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.02
(0.38) (0.28) (0.23) (0.19) (0.16) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07)
102m 1.54*** 1.19*** 0.88*** 0.54*** 0.40** 0.29** 0.20* 0.12 0.07 0.04
(0.39) (0.29) (0.24) (0.20) (0.16) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07)
108m 1.62*** 1.26*** 0.93*** 0.59*** 0.45*** 0.33** 0.25* 0.15 0.10 0.06
(0.40) (0.30) (0.25) (0.21) (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08)
114m 1.69*** 1.32*** 0.99*** 0.65*** 0.50*** 0.38** 0.29** 0.19 0.12 0.08
(0.41) (0.31) (0.26) (0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
120m 1.76*** 1.38*** 1.04*** 0.69*** 0.55*** 0.43*** 0.34** 0.23* 0.15 0.10
(0.42) (0.32) (0.27) (0.22) (0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09)
N 2,326 2,290 2,254 2,218 2,182 2,146 2,110 2,074 2,038 2,002
Notes: Coefficient estimates on the relative yield curve slope St − S∗t from regressions with the h-period log local currency-bond excess
return difference (Panel C) as dependent variable. Regressions are estimated using pooled end-of-month data for six currencies—AUD, CAD,
CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD for different samples. The log returns and yield curve slopes differentials are annualised. All
regressions include country fixed effects. The panels are unbalanced and standard errors (reported in parentheses) are constructed according
to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels, respectively.
24
the relative slope on local currency-bond excess returns differences. Through the lens of our
theory, a steep yield curve today signals relatively low distant-future valuations but, via (15),
relatively high nearer-term valuations. Reflecting this, the ERRP adjusts to transfer returns
intertemporally towards periods in which they are valued relatively highly.
Furthermore, the relative slope exerts its peak influence on dollar-bond and currency excess
returns at the 36-month holding period, close to the 42-month horizon its influence peaks in
the augmented UIP regression in section 3.1. The loading on the relative slope is largest in
magnitude at the 36-month horizon, for both rxFXj,t,t+h and rx
(κ),$
j,t,t+h − rx(κ)US,t,t+h for all bonds
with maturity of 42-months or more. The fact the relative slope loading is similar across bond
maturities for a given holding period is telling. It indicates that, insofar as the relative yield
curve slope reflects ERRP, its influence is strongest at a 3 to 4-year horizon, supporting our
interpretation the relative slope as an indicator of business cycle risk.
Second, while the relative yield curve slope does not significantly predict dollar-bond excess
return differences at the 6-month holding period for 10-year bonds, the relative slope loading
for for the same bond maturity is significantly non-zero over longer holding periods. While, in
the former case, the influence of the relative slope on currency and local-currency bond returns
offset one another (in line with Lustig et al., 2019), our results indicate that the influence of
the relative slope on the currency premium dominates over longer holding periods (with a tent
shape), even for long-term bonds. Nonetheless, for a given holding period, the influence of the
relative slope on dollar-bond returns decreases with maturity.
4 Accounting for Liquidity Yields
In recent work, Engel and Wu (2018) show evidence that the liquidity yield on government
bonds is a significant driver of exchange rates. The liquidity yield on a bond is the non-
pecuniary return that government bonds provide because of their safety, ease of sale and value
of collateral. Consistent with the predictions of a two-country New Keynesian model, they find
that more liquid currencies tend to appreciate contemporaneously focusing on 1-year interest
rates. In light of this, an important robustness test for our headline result is that the relative
yield curve slope continues to significantly influence exchange rate dynamics when accounting
for liquidity yields, insofar as liquidity yields influence domestic yield curves.
In this section, we extend our empirical specification to account for liquidity yields. The
analysis serves two purposes. First, we demonstrate that the tent-shaped relationship between
relative slope and ERRP across horizons is robust to the inclusion of liquidity yields. Second,
we build on the results of Engel and Wu (2018) by studying the influence of the term structure
of liquidity yields, not just a single horizon. Our results suggest that liquidity yields most
strongly influence ERRP at long horizons, indicating that they, in part, capture permanent
innovations to SDFs relevant for exchange rate dynamics and thus cross-sectional ERRP. In
this sense, liquidity yields operate independently from the business cycle risk we attribute to
relative yield curve slopes operating via transitory SDF innovations.
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4.1 Liquidity Yield-Augmented Regression
To account for liquidity yields in our empirical setup, we use data on the term structure of
liquidity yields from Du et al. (2018), as in Engel and Wu (2018).36 These measure the difference
between riskless market rates the government bond rate at different maturities to quantify the
implicit liquidity yield on a government bond, correcting for other frictions in forward markets
or sovereign default risk. Let ηRj,t,κ denote the κ-horizon liquidity premium for a κ-horizon US
government bond relative to an equivalent-maturity government bond yield in country j. An
increase in ηRj,t,κ thus reflects an increase in the relative liquidity of US Treasuries vis-a`-vis
country j.
Although the Du et al. (2018) data is available from 1991:04 for some countries and tenors
(e.g. UK), some series begin as late as 1999:01 due to data availability (e.g. euro area). Given
these shorter samples, the problem of non-overlapping observations becomes especially pertinent
in this section.37 For this reason, our preferred empirical specification extends on the excess
return regressions in section 3.3, rather than the augmented UIP regression in section 3.1.38
Our benchmark regression is therefore:
yj,t,h = γ1,h (Sj,t − S∗t ) + γ2,hηRj,t,κ + fj,h + εj,t+h (26)
where the dependent variable yj,t,h is either the excess return on the Home bond in USD
relative to the US rx
(κ),$
j,t,t+h − rx(κ)US,t,t+h (the ‘dollar-bond return’ difference), the excess return
from Home currency rxFXj,t,t+h, or the excess return on the Home bond in Home currency units
relative to the US rx
(κ)
j,t,t+h − rx(κ)US,t,t+h (the ‘local currency-bond return’ difference). Here,
the γ2,h estimate can be interpreted as the average influence of 1pp increase in relative US
Treasury convenience. When the currency excess return rxFXt,t+h is the dependent variable, a
positive γ2,h is hypothesised, with an increase in relative US Treasury liquidity associated with
a contemporaneous appreciation of the USD (depreciation of Home currency) that lowers the
ERRP λt,κ (increases currency excesses return rx
FX
t,t+h). The interpretation of γ1,h is unchanged
relative to section 3.3.
Results The results for the dollar-bond excess return difference are presented in table 4.
Panel A.i documents the estimated coefficient loadings on the relative slope, which are similar
to those in table 2. As before, the slope loading is insignificant for excess returns over short
holding periods for long-term bonds, as well as for long holding periods for long-term bonds,
consistent with evidence of UIP holding in the long run. At medium holding periods, the
influence of the slope is significant, with the coefficient peaking at business cycle horizons—in
this case, 2.5 to 3-years.
36The Du et al. (2018) data is available for 12, 24, 36, 60, 84 and 120-month tenors only, constraining the
maturities we assess in this section.
37For instance, a 10-year forecasting regression over a 20-year sample has zero non-overlapping observations.
38Nevertheless, Appendix B.4 presents extended UIP regression results, with liquidity yields and relative yield
curve factors as additional regressors. These corroborate the results from excess return regressions reported in
the main body of the paper.
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Table 4: Slope and liquidity yield coefficient estimates from pooled regression of excess returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Holding Periods
6m 12m 18m 24m 30m 36m 42m 48m 54m 60m
Panel A.i: Dependent Variable: rx
(κ),$
j,t,t+h − rx
(κ)
US,t,t+h, Coefficient on S − S∗
12m -1.74**
(0.68)
24m -1.29** -1.84** -2.34**
(0.54) (0.79) (0.91)
36m -1.06* -1.72** -2.27** -2.27** -2.29**
(0.54) (0.78) (0.89) (1.00) (1.02)
60m -0.52 -1.45* -2.18*** -2.44** -2.66*** -2.59** -2.09* -1.41 -1.07
(0.54) (0.74) (0.84) (0.97) (1.00) (1.01) (1.08) (1.29) (1.37)
84m -0.06 -1.13 -1.92** -2.28** -2.62*** -2.64** -2.20** -1.60 -1.32 -1.11
(0.57) (0.73) (0.83) (0.97) (1.00) (1.02) (1.09) (1.29) (1.37) (1.48)
120m 0.38 -0.73 -1.58* -1.98** -2.34** -2.44** -2.15** -1.68 -1.53 -1.34
(0.61) (0.73) (0.80) (0.92) (0.94) (0.95) (0.96) (1.11) (1.16) (1.26)
Panel A.ii: Dependent Variable: rx
(κ),$
t,t+h, Coefficient on η
R
κ
12m 0.03
(0.02)
24m 0.00 0.04 0.06**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
36m 0.01 0.04 0.07** 0.12*** 0.16***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
60m -0.00 0.03 0.05 0.09** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.21***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
84m 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.08** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.22***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
120m -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07* 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.29***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
N 1,733 1,697 1,661 1,625 1,589 1,553 1,517 1,481 1,445 1,409
Notes: Coefficient estimates on the relative yield curve slope St −S∗t (Panel A.i) and cross-country κ-period liquidity yield ηRκ (Panel A.ii)
from regressions with the log dollar-bond excess return difference as dependent variable. Regressions are estimated using pooled end-of-
month data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD for different samples within 1991:04-2017:12.
The log returns and yield curve slopes differentials are annualised. All regressions include country fixed effects. The panels are unbalanced
and standard errors (reported in parentheses) are constructed according to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
Panel A.ii documents a pattern of monotonically increasing γ2,h coefficients for liquidity
yields. As the holding period increases, the loading on the liquidity yield becomes more positive
and more statistically significant. In this case, a higher US Treasury liquidity premium is
associated with a higher excess return on a Home bond in USD terms.
Tables 5 and 6 decompose these findings into the influence on currency and local currency-
bond excess returns, respectively. As in section 3.3 a comparison of the two tables indicates
that the influence of both of relative slope and relative liquidity yields on dollar-bond excess
returns predominantly works through currency excess returns, with the sign of coefficients for
the former matching those of the latter.
Panel B.i of table 5 demonstrates that the relative slope loadings for currency excess returns
are negative and tent-shaped with respect to holding period. As before, an increase in the
Home country’s relative yield curve slope is associated with a subsequent depreciation, that
occurs most strongly at business cycle horizons. In contrast, the relative slope loadings for local
currency-bond excess return differences are positive and quantitatively small.
The γ2,h coefficient estimates for currency excess returns are presented in panel B.ii of table
5. For a given maturity, the coefficient on the relative liquidity yield rises monotonically with
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Table 5: Slope and liquidity yield coefficient estimates from pooled regression of excess returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Holding Periods
6m 12m 18m 24m 30m 36m 42m 48m 54m 60m
Panel B.i: Dependent Variable: rxFXj,t,t+h, Coefficient on S − S∗, when ηRκ is additional control
12m -1.71** -2.21**
(0.70) (0.98)
24m -1.50*** -1.87** -2.32** -2.31**
(0.56) (0.82) (0.92) (1.03)
36m -1.48*** -1.85** -2.27** -2.24** -2.26** -2.07**
(0.56) (0.82) (0.92) (1.02) (1.02) (1.02)
60m -1.55*** -2.02** -2.51*** -2.61** -2.76*** -2.65** -2.11* -1.42 -1.07 -0.78
(0.57) (0.80) (0.91) (1.02) (1.03) (1.03) (1.09) (1.30) (1.37) (1.47)
84m -1.59*** -2.12*** -2.61*** -2.77*** -3.00*** -2.93*** -2.41** -1.76 -1.44 -1.21
(0.58) (0.80) (0.92) (1.05) (1.06) (1.05) (1.12) (1.32) (1.39) (1.49)
120m -1.59*** -2.14*** -2.69*** -2.86*** -3.11*** -3.11*** -2.70*** -2.11* -1.86 -1.62
(0.57) (0.79) (0.91) (1.03) (1.02) (0.99) (0.99) (1.14) (1.20) (1.30)
Panel B.ii: Dependent Variable: rxFXt,t+h, Coefficient on η
R
κ
12m 0.03 0.06**
(0.02) (0.03)
24m 0.02 0.05* 0.06** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
36m 0.02 0.05* 0.08** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.19***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
60m 0.02 0.05* 0.07** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
84m 0.02 0.06** 0.07** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
120m 0.02 0.05* 0.07** 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.30***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
N 1,733 1,697 1,661 1,625 1,589 1,553 1,517 1,481 1,445 1,409
Notes: Coefficient estimates on the relative yield curve slope St − S∗t (Panel B.i) and cross-country κ-period liquidity yield ηRκ (Panel
B.ii) from regressions with the log currency excess return as dependent variable. Regressions are estimated using pooled end-of-month
data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD for different samples within 1991:04-2017:12. The log
returns and yield curve slopes differentials are annualised. All regressions include country fixed effects. All regressions include country fixed
effects. The panels are unbalanced and standard errors (reported in parentheses) are constructed according to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
methodology. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Because
currency excess returns are invariant to bond maturity, and depend only on the holding period (unlike the dollar- and local currency-bond
returns), we are able to present coefficient estimates on the relative slope and liquidity yield for all holding periods up to, and including,
the bond maturity.
respect to holding period, growing in significance. This suggests that the liquidity yields may
contain some information about permanent SDF variations, extending the results in Lustig et al.
(2019). In contrast, the γ2,h loadings for local currency-bond excess returns are negative and
comparably small in magnitude.
4.2 Interpreting the Role of Liquidity Yields
We briefly interpret our results through the lens of our preference-free framework, in which
we draw on Jiang et al. (2018) to model liquidity yields. The theory highlights a key differ-
ence between liquidity yields and relative yield curve slopes in their contribution to currency
premia: liquidity yields capture permanent innovations to SDFs and influence long-horizon
(cross-country) exchange rate differences, while relative yield curve slopes reflect business cycle
risks captured in transitory SDF innovations.
Extending (5) and (4), let the Home and Foreign (US) representative investors’ Euler equa-
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Table 6: Slope and liquidity yield coefficient estimates from pooled regression of excess returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Holding Periods
6m 12m 18m 24m 30m 36m 42m 48m 54m 60m
Panel C.i: Dependent Variable: rx
(κ)
j,t,t+h − rx
(κ)
US,t,t+h, Coefficient on S − S∗, when ηRκ is additional control
12m -0.03
(0.05)
24m 0.21* 0.03 -0.01
(0.12) (0.08) (0.03)
36m 0.42** 0.13 0.00 -0.04 -0.02
(0.19) (0.15) (0.10) (0.06) (0.03)
60m 1.03*** 0.57** 0.33 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02
(0.31) (0.25) (0.20) (0.15) (0.11) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
84m 1.52*** 0.99*** 0.70*** 0.50** 0.38** 0.30** 0.23** 0.17* 0.14** 0.11**
(0.39) (0.32) (0.27) (0.22) (0.17) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05)
120m 1.97*** 1.41*** 1.11*** 0.89*** 0.77*** 0.67*** 0.56*** 0.44*** 0.35*** 0.28***
(0.50) (0.39) (0.33) (0.27) (0.22) (0.18) (0.16) (0.14) (0.12) (0.09)
Panel C.ii: Dependent Variable: rx
(κ)
t,t+h, Coefficient on η
R
κ
12m 0.00
(0.00)
24m -0.01 -0.01** -0.00***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
36m -0.01 -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
60m -0.02** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
84m -0.02 -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
120m -0.03* -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 1,733 1,697 1,661 1,625 1,589 1,553 1,517 1,481 1,445 1,409
Notes: Coefficient estimates on the relative yield curve slope St −S∗t (Panel C.i) and cross-country κ-period liquidity yield ηRκ (Panel C.ii)
from regressions with the log local currency-bond excess return difference as dependent variable. Regressions are estimated using pooled
end-of-month data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD for different samples within 1991:04-
2017:12. The log returns and yield curve slopes differentials are annualised. All regressions include country fixed effects. All regressions
include country fixed effects. The panels are unbalanced and standard errors (reported in parentheses) are constructed according to the
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels,
respectively.
tions for US bonds be given by,
eξt,κ = Et
[
Mˆt,t+κ
Et+κ
Et R
∗
t,κ
]
(27)
eξ
∗
t,κ = Et[Mˆ
∗
t,t+κR
∗
t,κ] (28)
where ξt,κ denotes the liquidity yield of US bonds for Home investors and ξ
∗ denotes the liquidity
yield of US bonds for the Foreign representative investor. For simplicity, the liquidity yield of
Home bonds is normalised to zero. In comparison to (5) and (4), the SDFs in (27) and (28)
have the following relation: M
(∗)
t,t+κ ≡ Mˆ (∗)t,t+κe−ξ
(∗)
t,κ .39
Jiang et al. (2018) conjecture the exchange rate process follows ∆κet+κ = mt,t+κ−m∗t,t+κ +
(ξ∗t,κ − ξt,κ), which cannot hold under complete markets. Consequently, we interpret liquidity
yields as a form of non-traded risk, as in Lustig and Verdelhan (2019) who show that under
39In Appendix C.4, we show that this can be derived by decomposing the SDF into a pecuniary and a liquidity
component, and we show that liquidity yields confound the liquidity need of the investor, the liquidity offered by
the asset and the asset-investor specific liquidity yield.
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incomplete markets:
∆κet+κ = mt,t+κ −m∗t,t+κ + ηt,t+κ,
such that exchange rates (or, conversely, the Foreign SDF) are uniquely determined for a given
wedge ηt,t+κ. Liquidity has a natural interpretation as a form of non-traded risk since it cor-
responds to missing insurance markets, such that ηt,t+κ ∝ ξ∗t,κ − ξt,κ. If there existed perfect
liquidity insurance, bonds would not carry a liquidity premium.40 The risk premium can then
be expressed as:
Et[λt,κ] =
1
2
[vart(mt,t+κ)− vart(m∗t,t+κ)] +Et[ξ∗t,κ − ξt,κ]. (29)
Thus liquidity yields can contribute to exchange rate predictability, as in table 5.41
The mechanism discussed in section 2.3 generalises to the case with liquidity considerations.
Notice that the risk premium reflects the difference in liquidity yields from the same asset. It
therefore captures investors’ liquidity needs and asset-investor specific liquidity. If the foreign
economy is liquidity constrained such that the liquidity yield differential is high ξ∗t,κ > ξt,κ,
ERRP result in an expected appreciation of foreign exchange rates since foreign investors are
willing to forego pecuniary returns in favour of liquidity. In levels, this is consistent with Jiang
et al. (2018) who show that highly liquid countries experience a contemporaneous appreciation.
Deriving (16) with an additional term for liquidity yield differentials results in:
λ
(∞)
t,1 =
1
2
[vart(ν
P
t+1)− vart(νP∗t+1)] + [ξ∗t,∞ − ξt,∞]
If λ
(∞)
t,1 tends to zero, our empirical results suggest that drift in the relative liquidity yield may
contribute to cross-country differences in the variation of the permanent component of pricing
kernels:
1
2
[vart(ν
P
t+1)− vart(νP∗t+1)] = −[ξ∗t,∞ − ξt,∞]
5 Yield Curve Inversions and Exchange Rate Dynamics
So far in this paper, we have focused on the role of the term structure in capturing business cycle
risks relevant for exchange rate dynamics. In this section, we study how the term structure also
captures changes in patterns of risk—i.e. reversals in UIP dynamics—which we find coincide
with yield curve inversions.
5.1 Testing the Influence of Yield Curve Inversions
To test the influence of yield curve inversions, on short to medium-horizon UIP dynamics espe-
cially, we alter our benchmark yield curve-augmented UIP regression specification. Consistent
40Formally, if there is a traded asset that yields returns ξˆ in the form of liquidity services, by the definition of
non-traded risk then covt(ξt,κ, ηt,t+κ) = 0.
41ERRP are determined by the difference in liquidity yields which matters because US investors’ liquidity
yields lowers their domestic yields.
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with our findings in section 3, we continue to include the relative yield curve slope and curva-
ture in our regression. Second, to account for the effect of yield curve inversions, we define an
indicator variable 1j,t ≡ 1 (Sj,t < 0) which is set equal to unity in months when the domestic
yield curve is inverted. Because we use the domestic, country-j, yield curve as the indicator, our
indicator variable varies across countries, providing useful cross-sectional variation to identify
interaction effects. The general updated regression is:
ej,t+κ − ej,t =β1,κ
(
ij,t,κ − i∗t,κ
)
+ δκ
[(
ij,t,κ − i∗t,κ
)× 1j,t]+ β2,κ (Sj,t − S∗t )
+ β3,κ (Cj,t − C∗t ) + ϑκ1j,t + fj,κ + uj,t+κ (30)
In the main body of the paper, we report results using an indicator variable that is set to
unity during months of a domestic yield curve inversion only, and zero otherwise. However, in
an Appendix, we demonstrate that our findings are robust to extending the definition of the
dummy variable indicator such that it is equal to unity for an additional 1 to 2 years after the
yield curve ceases to be inverted, capturing the real economic effects of a downturn. To ensure
that we capture the same set of global macroeconomic events for all countries, we shorten our
benchmark sample to one that is common for all our G7 currencies, 1992:07-2017:12, although
our results are robust to trimming the sample at 2008:06 to exclude the global financial crisis
and post-crisis periods.42
Figure 6 presents coefficient estimates for β1,κ (no inversion) and β1,κ + δκ (with inversion)
for all horizons. At short horizons, the UIP coefficient, and the sign of ERRP, is significantly
different in periods where the domestic yield curve is inverted. For instance, at the 6-month
horizon, the implied UIP coefficient outside of inversion periods is −1.55, while during periods of
domestic yield curve inversion the implied coefficient is 7.71, implying a more than proportional
relationship between exchange rates and interest differentials. Consistent with the ‘New Fama
Puzzle’, our results indicate that the sign of short-horizon UIP coefficients flips in periods
following a yield curve inversion. In contrast, at medium and longer-horizons, the differences
between the two periods are insignificantly different.
Table 7 documents relative slope and curvature coefficient estimates, in addition to β1,κ and
δκ estimates from the extended regression. Even when accounting for the additional interaction,
the loadings on the relative slope continue to exhibit a tent shape with respect to maturity,
peaking at the 3.5 to 4-year horizon.
5.2 Understanding Yield Curve Inversions
Our empirical contribution is to show that an inversion in the yield curve is associated with a
statistically significant ‘sign reversal’ in the UIP regression coefficient at short horizons. The-
oretical models reconcile UIP by generating covt(λt,κ, it,κ − i∗t,κ) < 0, but are unable to deliver
this covariance conditional on an upward sloping yield curve, and by extension, cannot explain
the reversal in the sign of this covariance observed conditional on an inversion.
42We also show that extending the sample to 1980:01 is associated with significant changes in exchange rate
dynamics, although differences are not as stark compared to the balanced panel sample that starts in 1992:07.
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Table 7: Coefficient estimates from UIP regressions with additional yield curve inversion
interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UIP Regression Augmented Regression
iκ − i∗κ 1× (iκ − i∗κ) iκ − i∗κ 1× (iκ − i∗κ) S − S∗ C − C∗
6-months -1.55** 9.26*** 0.11 8.83*** 1.51** -1.25
(0.71) (1.86) (1.11) (1.91) (0.71) (1.01)
12-months -1.71*** 7.29*** -0.29 7.16*** 2.22* -1.21
(0.60) (1.03) (0.93) (1.09) (1.23) (1.70)
18-months -1.50*** 4.39*** 0.23 4.39*** 3.82** -1.79
(0.56) (0.73) (0.85) (0.78) (1.52) (2.02)
24-months -1.19** 2.60*** 0.62 2.59*** 5.25*** -3.02
(0.53) (0.68) (0.77) (0.74) (1.76) (2.29)
30-months -0.85* 1.59*** 1.18* 1.48** 7.27*** -5.21**
(0.47) (0.56) (0.67) (0.63) (1.85) (2.50)
36-months -0.52 0.75 1.54*** 0.48 8.73*** -7.58***
(0.39) (0.53) (0.55) (0.62) (1.66) (2.22)
42-months -0.11 0.58 1.92*** 0.17 9.94*** -10.07***
(0.40) (0.53) (0.45) (0.60) (1.55) (2.15)
48-months 0.37 0.33 2.19*** -0.05 9.94*** -10.38***
(0.41) (0.46) (0.35) (0.49) (1.66) (2.32)
54-months 0.83** 0.09 2.47*** -0.23 9.97*** -10.25***
(0.40) (0.43) (0.25) (0.46) (1.86) (2.42)
60-months 1.16*** 0.14 2.62*** -0.10 9.71*** -9.61***
(0.37) (0.38) (0.22) (0.41) (2.04) (2.61)
66-months 1.39*** 0.23 2.52*** 0.17 8.06*** -6.28**
(0.32) (0.32) (0.23) (0.33) (2.19) (2.74)
72-months 1.58*** -0.01 2.36*** 0.13 5.81*** -2.01
(0.25) (0.32) (0.23) (0.32) (2.14) (2.67)
78-months 1.55*** 0.26 2.06*** 0.45 3.92* 0.15
(0.22) (0.36) (0.23) (0.37) (2.06) (2.70)
84-months 1.50*** 0.65 1.83*** 0.83* 2.98 0.65
(0.21) (0.43) (0.21) (0.45) (2.00) (2.84)
90-months 1.47*** 0.90* 1.68*** 1.08** 2.24 1.17
(0.20) (0.46) (0.20) (0.49) (1.95) (2.95)
96-months 1.38*** 0.86** 1.50*** 1.10** 1.30 3.03
(0.21) (0.41) (0.21) (0.46) (2.00) (3.13)
102-months 1.26*** 0.66* 1.36*** 0.90** 1.40 3.05
(0.22) (0.36) (0.22) (0.41) (1.97) (3.01)
108-months 1.08*** 0.49 1.14*** 0.73* 0.75 4.03
(0.22) (0.34) (0.22) (0.40) (1.99) (3.00)
114-months 0.89*** 0.55** 0.94*** 0.80** 0.66 4.35
(0.22) (0.27) (0.22) (0.33) (2.07) (3.31)
120-months 0.77*** 0.21 0.82*** 0.37 1.32 3.26
(0.19) (0.24) (0.19) (0.28) (1.80) (3.24)
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present estimates from a regression the κ-period exchange rate change on the κ-period interest
rate differential ij,κ − i∗κ, a dummy variable indicator for country-j yield curve inversions 1j and an interaction between
the two 1j ×
(
ij,κ − i∗κ
)
. Columns (3)-(6) present estimates from the same regression with two additional regressors, the
relative yield curve slope Sj − S∗ and curvature Cj − C∗. The inversion indicator 1j is set to 1 in months where the
country-j yield curve slope is negative, and zero otherwise. Regressions are estimated using pooled end-of-month data for
six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD from 1992:07 to 2017:12. All regressions include
country fixed effects. The panel is balanced and standard errors (reported in parentheses) are constructed according to
the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and
1% significance levels, respectively.
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Figure 6: Estimated coefficients from UIP regression augmented with domestic yield curve
inversion indicator interactions
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Notes: Black crosses denote βˆ1,κ estimates and red dots denote βˆ1,κ + δˆκ estimates from regression (30). The
horizontal axis denotes the horizon κ in months. Regressions estimated using pooled monthly data for six
currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the US from 1992:07 to 2017:12 (common sample
for all), including country fixed effects. Yield curve inversion indicator is set equal to 1 when the domestic yield
curve slope Sj,t is less than 0. 95% confidence intervals, calculated using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard
errors are denoted by gray shaded area and red bars, respectively, around point estimates.
A sizeable literature explains UIP failures with external habits, building on Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) or Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences, and stochastic volatility. Verdelhan
(2010) generates the desired covariance between the ERRP and the interest rate differential
using a consumption based model with external habits at the expense of a downward sloping
yield curve.43 Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) use Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences and can
generate both empirically consistent UIP deviations and an upward sloping term structure using
idiosyncratic (country) shocks to real (consumption) and nominal (inflation) volatilty. However,
for the ERRP and the cross-country yield differential, only total uncertainty matters and the
model implies that the high-yield currency appreciates in excess of UIP, independently of the
slope of the yield curve.
A large and growing literature on disaster risk and currency crashes attributes the excess
43Wachter (2006) show that countercyclical interest rates are needed to produce an upward sloping yield curve
in this environment. However, this framework (as in Verdelhan (2010)) requires procyclical rates to deliver
empirically consistent UIP deviations. Grasso and Natoli (2018) extend Wachter (2006) and present a model
that delivers yield curve inversions following a temporary rise in consumption uncertainty but the model then
produces UIP dynamics that we find to hold only conditional on an upwards yield curve.
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volatility to non-Gaussian (jump) shocks to the SDF, see Gabaix (2012) and Farhi et al. (2015).44
In particular, Farhi and Gabaix (2016) consider a domestic country-j SDF given by:
Mj,t,t+1 =
(
Cj,t+1
Cj,t
)1−γ
×
1 if no disaster at t+ 1 with probability 1− ptB−γt+1Fj,t+1 if disaster at t+ 1 with probability pt (31)
while during a disaster event, the world SDF is scaled only by B−γt+1. The factor Bt+1 denotes
the size of the disaster and is common across countries as is probability of disasters, while Fj,t+1
is idiosyncratic and captures the sensitivity of the domestic currency to global disasters.45
Countries whose domestic currency depreciates heavily during disasters feature a higher
interest rate. Farhi et al. (2015) investigate this model in reduced form, and define disaster
vulnerability by pt(Jj,t − 1) = pt(B−γt+1Fj,t+1 − 1). In the limit of small time intervals,46
ij,t = gj,t − ptEt[Jj,t − 1],
λt = covt(t, t − ∗t ) + ptEt[Jj,t − J∗j,t]
where gj,t is the growth rate of consumption in country j and t is an innovation to consumption
growth. For the risk premium, the first term relates to our standard expression, while the
second term is the difference in vulnerabilities. If the probability of a disaster rises (or a
disaster occurs) the high yield currency will tend to depreciate further, as we observed during
the global financial crisis. Note that this is consistent with the mechanism outlined in section
2.3: investors in disaster-vulnerable countries experience a large depreciation to compensate for
a large consumption shock. Outside of disasters, an appreciation reallocates consumption the
the (uncertain) future.
Gabaix (2012) shows, in a closed economy context, that an upward sloping nominal yield
curve will arise if disasters are associated with a jump in inflation, akin to a supply-driven
shock. Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) rely on the same mechanism, but model inflation using
Gaussian risk. The mechanism is that long-term bond returns are eroded by inflation and
therefore bond premia must be rising with maturity. Our findings suggest that while yield
curves are upward sloping during normal times, when the probability of disaster pt is low,
yield curve inversions arise at the onset of crises, when the probability of a disaster is high.
Consequently, a combination of Gaussian inflation risk as in Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) and
deflation associated with disaster events—consistent with a demand-driven shock—would deliver
the conditional UIP deviations we document.47 Were disaster events to be associated with
44This related to a large, earlier, empirical literature on Peso events. While Peso events focus on a small sample
issue—i.e. that there are large rare depreciations out of sample—disaster risk focuses on risk premia which arise
even if Peso events occur in sample.
45In Farhi and Gabaix (2016), the factor Fj,t+1 multiplies the yield in traded goods (world nume´raire) from
investing a single non-traded good. Their concept of an exchange rate coincides with traditional notions in the
limit where the consumption basket consists only of non-tradable goods.
46Discrete time equations are presented in Farhi and Gabaix (2016).
47Consistent with this, Cujean and Hasler (2017) show that whilst an increase in nominal uncertainty increases
bond premia (due to non-neutral inflation), an increase in real uncertainty (the component of σj relating to Bt+1)
lowers bond premia.
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inflation—i.e. via supply-driven shocks—this mechanism would be weaker. Indeed, Appendix
B.5 shows that our results are somewhat sensitive to sample inclusion, with results for the
UIP switch weakening when the sample start date is extended back 1980:01, which may be
attributable to changes in the relationship between inflation and disasters over time.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the extent to which information in the term structure of interest rates
can explain ERRP, over and above spot rate differentials. Our main empirical finding is that
a country with a relatively steep yield curve will tend to experience a depreciation in excess of
UIP at business cycle horizons—3 to 5 years, especially. This result arises in both a long-horizon
panel UIP regression and a regression of excess returns over varying holding periods.
To interpret our findings, we begin with a reprisal of UIP cast in an equilibrium asset
pricing setup, and we argue that ERRP lower the risk for investors holding foreign bonds. In
particular, an expected depreciation systematically reallocates consumption intertemporally to
investors with a relatively high valuation of returns. The relative slope of the yield curve across
countries contains information about the future path of SDFs and captures the relative desire
for intertemporal reallocation. By decomposing the SDF into a transitory and a permanent
component, we show formally that ERRP variation predictable by the relative slope arises as
compensation for transitory risk. By means of two analytical examples for SDF processes, we
derive both the sign and the horizon-variation of the relationship between the relative slope of
the yield curve and ERRP.
Our findings are robust to the inclusion of liquidity yields which we show operate through a
distinct channel. In contrast to business cycle risk captured by the relative slope, liquidity yields
contribute to cross-sectional differences across currencies and capture permanent differences in
SDFs.
Finally, we show that yield curve inversions coincide with periods of reversals in the joint
dynamics of exchange rates and interest rates. While the yield curve is upward sloping, standard
ERRP dynamics suggest that high yield currencies experience an excess appreciation at short
horizons. In contrast, following yield curve inversions, high yield currencies tend to experience
an excess depreciation—even if we exclude the global financial crisis from our sample. While we
show that this poses a challenge for many consumption asset pricing models, it can be reconciled
in a model of rare disasters.
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Appendix
A Data Sources
We use nominal zero-coupon government bond yields at maturities from 6 months out to ten
years for 7 different industrialised countries in our benchmark sample: the United States, Aus-
tralia, Canada, the euro area, Japan, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Our benchmark
sample begins in 1980:01 and ends in 2017:12, although the panel of interest rates is unbal-
anced as nominal zero-coupon bond yields are not available from the start of the sample in all
jurisdictions. Table 8 summarises the sources of nominal zero-coupon government bond yields,
and the sample availability, for the benchmark economies in our study. In robustness analyses,
we also assess results for a broader set of G10 currencies—adding New Zealand, Norway and
Sweden—for which zero-coupon government bond yields are available to 2009:05 from Wright
(2011).
Table 8: Yield Curve Data Sources
Country Sources Start Date
US Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) 1971:11
Australia Reserve Bank of Australia 1992:07
Canada Bank of Canada 1986:01
Euro Area Bundesbank (German Yields) 1980:01
Japan Wright (2011) and Bank of England 1986:01
Switzerland Swiss National Bank 1988:01
UK Anderson and Sleath (2001) 1975:01
Notes: Data from before 1980:01 are not used in this paper.
Exchange rate data is from Datastream, reflecting end-of-month spot rates vis-a`-vis the
US dollar. Liquidity yields are from Du et al. (2018), available at the 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10-year
maturities. The earliest liquidity yields are available from 1991:04 for some countries (e.g. UK).
The latest liquidity yields are available from 1999:01 (e.g. euro area). For both exchange rates
and liquidity yields, we use end-of-month observations.
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B Empirical Results
B.1 Canonical UIP Regression
In section 2, we document horizon-variation in the UIP condition, corroborating results in Chinn
and Meredith (2005) and Chinn and Quayyum (2012). The results in figure 2 are derived from
a panel regression of six currencies vis-a`-vis the US dollar.
In table 9, we document that the broad upward sloping relationship between the UIP coef-
ficient β1,κ and the horizon κ is robust when regressions are estimated on a country-by-country
basis too. Column (1) of the table reprises the panel coefficient estimates of figure 2, with stan-
dard errors (reported in parentheses) constructed using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) method-
ology. Columns (2)-(7) reports coefficient estimates for country-specific regressions. For each
of these individual country regressions, we report Newey and West (1987) standard errors with
five lags to account for serial correlation.
For all six currencies, short-horizon β1,κ coefficient estimates are negative out to, at least,
the 24-month horizon. The coefficient rise with the horizon to be significantly above zero at
longer tenors and, in most cases, close to unity.
B.2 Yield Curve-Augmented UIP Regression
In this Appendix, we document the robustness of our benchmark results in section 3.1, along a
number of dimensions.
Conservative Inference As discussed in section 3.1, long-horizon forecasting regressions
like (7) and (12) can face size distortions, whereby the null hypothesis is rejected too often.
Valkanov (2003) demonstrates that this problem is especially pertinent when samples are small
and when regressors are persistent. Although the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
used in the panel regressions in the main body of the paper are robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation, we assess the robustness of our findings using alternative inference in this
Appendix.
Following Moon et al. (2004), we use scaled t-statistics, whereby standard t-statistics are
multiplied by 1/
√
κ. In the context of long-horizon forecasting regressions like ours, Moon
et al. (2004) demonstrate that these scaled t-statistics are approximately standard normal when
regressors are sufficiently persistent. However, because the scaled t-statistics can tend to under-
reject the null when regressors are not near-integrated, we view these t-statistics as providing
more conservative inference than the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors in the paper’s
main body.
Importantly, our headline result—the tent-shaped pattern of the coefficient loading on the
relative yield curve slope with respect to the horizon κ—is robust to the use of this more
conservative inference. To demonstrate this, figure 7 plots the β2,κ estimates from (12) with
90% confidence intervals implied by these scaled t-statistics. Relative to table 1, point estimates
are unchanged. But the error bands implied by the scaled t-statistics are wider. Nevertheless,
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Table 9: Coefficient estimates from canonical UIP regression for pooled regression and
country-specific regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Maturity Panel Australia Canada Switzerland Euro area Japan United
Kingdom
6-months -1.06 -0.75 -0.08 -1.28 -0.84 -1.57* -1.23
(0.65) (1.92) (0.58) (0.92) (0.92) (0.83) (1.13)
12-months -0.99** -1.44 -0.00 -1.26* -0.64 -1.37** -0.99
(0.50) (1.20) (0.59) (0.72) (0.73) (0.69) (0.89)
18-months -0.87** -1.91** -0.13 -1.08* -0.46 -1.02 -0.92
(0.43) (0.79) (0.60) (0.60) (0.69) (0.67) (0.72)
24-months -0.67* -1.62** -0.08 -1.05** -0.22 -0.68 -0.78
(0.39) (0.69) (0.58) (0.52) (0.65) (0.65) (0.68)
30-months -0.47 -1.29* 0.09 -1.19*** -0.10 -0.22 -0.64
(0.35) (0.68) (0.56) (0.44) (0.64) (0.62) (0.64)
36-months -0.25 -0.98 0.33 -1.26*** 0.01 0.17 -0.23
(0.33) (0.72) (0.54) (0.38) (0.62) (0.61) (0.55)
42-months 0.05 -0.34 0.54 -1.01** 0.23 0.49 0.07
(0.33) (0.76) (0.51) (0.41) (0.57) (0.57) (0.56)
48-months 0.35 0.55 0.84* -0.62 0.43 0.70 0.26
(0.31) (0.75) (0.50) (0.39) (0.51) (0.53) (0.55)
54-months 0.67** 1.43** 1.06** -0.25 0.66 0.89* 0.62
(0.28) (0.68) (0.51) (0.37) (0.45) (0.50) (0.49)
60-months 0.90*** 2.30*** 1.18** -0.02 0.87** 1.00** 0.75*
(0.25) (0.57) (0.48) (0.36) (0.40) (0.48) (0.43)
66-months 1.11*** 2.92*** 1.43*** 0.27 1.09*** 1.05** 0.78**
(0.23) (0.46) (0.42) (0.34) (0.37) (0.46) (0.38)
72-months 1.27*** 3.20*** 1.56*** 0.51* 1.25*** 1.04** 0.95***
(0.19) (0.39) (0.36) (0.29) (0.33) (0.44) (0.32)
78-months 1.31*** 3.07*** 1.56*** 0.69*** 1.34*** 0.92** 1.02***
(0.17) (0.37) (0.36) (0.25) (0.30) (0.41) (0.31)
84-months 1.27*** 2.88*** 1.52*** 0.75*** 1.35*** 0.81** 0.94***
(0.17) (0.34) (0.38) (0.22) (0.29) (0.39) (0.27)
90-months 1.20*** 2.63*** 1.50*** 0.74*** 1.35*** 0.72** 0.82***
(0.17) (0.31) (0.41) (0.26) (0.28) (0.36) (0.25)
96-months 1.08*** 2.15*** 1.42*** 0.57* 1.28*** 0.69* 0.69***
(0.17) (0.33) (0.43) (0.31) (0.26) (0.36) (0.24)
102-months 0.94*** 1.74*** 1.35*** 0.38 1.15*** 0.64* 0.54**
(0.17) (0.39) (0.45) (0.36) (0.24) (0.37) (0.21)
108-months 0.81*** 1.56*** 1.25*** 0.15 1.04*** 0.59 0.40**
(0.17) (0.38) (0.46) (0.39) (0.22) (0.37) (0.20)
114-months 0.73*** 1.45*** 1.15** 0.02 0.94*** 0.68* 0.30
(0.17) (0.37) (0.47) (0.37) (0.22) (0.37) (0.19)
120-months 0.68*** 1.40*** 1.23*** -0.12 0.85*** 0.78** 0.17
(0.16) (0.34) (0.47) (0.34) (0.21) (0.35) (0.20)
Notes: Coefficient estimates from regression (7)—the canonical UIP regression—a regression of the κ-period ex-
change rate change ∆κet+κ on the κ-period interest rate differential it,κ − i∗t,κ. Regressions are estimated using
pooled end-of-month data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD from
1980:01 to 2017:12. Column (1) presents coefficient estimates from a panel regression of all six countries, including
country fixed effects. The panel is unbalanced and standard errors (reported in parentheses) are constructed accord-
ing to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. Columns (2)-(7) report coefficient estimates from country-specific
regressions. Newey and West (1987) standard errors (reported in parentheses) are constructed with a maximum lag
of 5. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Figure 7: Estimated relative slope coefficients from augmented UIP regression using more
conservative inference
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Notes: Black circles denote βˆ2,κ point estimates from regression (12). The horizontal axis denotes the horizon κ
in months. In regression (12), the slope and curvature in each country are measured using proxies. Regressions
are estimated using pooled monthly data from 1980:01 to 2017:12, including country fixed effects. 90% confidence
intervals, calculated using implied standard errors from scaled t-statistics proposed by Moon et al. (2004) standard
errors, are denoted by thick black bars around point estimates.
point estimates are significantly positive according to the more conservative inference from the
2.5 to 4-year horizons, within which the peak of the tent arises.
In addition, figure 8 plots the β1,κ and β3,κ coefficient estimates from (12) alongside the
90% confidence bands implied by the scaled t-statistics. While the overall pattern of β1,κ
coefficients is broadly the same as the canonical UIP regression, the confidence bands with
these more conservative t-statistics are wider. Importantly, the scaled t-statistics also imply
that the coefficients on the relative yield curve curvature are statistically insignificant at all
horizons.
Sub-sample Stability To assess the stability of our results, we estimate regression (12) on
two sub-samples. The first, from 1980:01 to 2008:06, is intended to capture the pre-crisis period.
The second, from 1990:01 to 2017:12, includes the post-crisis period.48
The slope coefficient estimates from different sub-samples are presented in table 10. For
comparison, column (1) includes the relative slope coefficient loadings from our benchmark
48We cannot run long-horizon regressions over a purely post-crisis sample because our regressions rely on ex
post exchange rate changes.
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Figure 8: Estimated relative slope coefficients from augmented UIP regression using more
conservative inference
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Notes: Black circles denote βˆ1,κ (left-hand side) and βˆ3,κ (right-hand side) point estimates from regression (12).
The horizontal axis denotes the horizon κ in months. In regression (12), the slope and curvature in each country
are measured using proxies. Regressions are estimated using pooled monthly data from 1980:01 to 2017:12,
including country fixed effects. 90% confidence intervals, calculated using implied standard errors from scaled t-
statistics proposed by Moon et al. (2004) standard errors, are denoted by thick black bars around point estimates.
sample presented in the main body of the paper. Columns (3) and (4) include the estimated
loadings over the pre-crisis and predominantly post-crisis samples, respectively. In both cases
the coefficient estimates form a tent shape with respect to maturity, peaking at the 4 and
3.5-year horizons, respectively.
In addition, columns (2) and (5) present two additional robustness exercises. In column (2),
we use available G10 currency and yield curve data, adding Sweden, Norway and New Zealand
to our cross-section of countries, for the pre-crisis period only.49 In column (5), we drop the
relative curvature from regression (12), to demonstrate that the relative slope coefficient is
independent on the inclusion of the relative curvature. In both cases, the relative slope loadings
continue to follow a tent-shaped pattern with respect to maturity.
Country-Specific Regressions Table 11 presents country-specific estimates of the yield
curve augmented-UIP regression. Inference is conducted using Newey and West (1987) standard
errors, to account for serial correlation. For comparison, column (1) presents the benchmark
relative slope coefficient estimates from the panel regression discussed in the main body of the
paper. Although coefficient estimates vary in size and significance across countries, a relative
slope coefficient estimates display a tent shape with respect to horizon κ for 4 of the 6 currencies
in our sample (AUD, CHF, EUR, GBP).
49We do not have complete zero-coupon bond yield curves for these countries post-crisis, hence we omit them
from our results in the main body of the paper.
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Table 10: Slope coefficient estimates from augmented UIP regression for pooled regression
across different samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Maturity 1980:01-
2017:12
1980:01-
2008:06
1980:01-
2008:06
1990:01-
2017:12
1980:01-
2017:12
G7
Currencies
G10
Currencies
G7
Currencies
G7
Currencies
Excl. C − C∗
G7 Curr.
6-months 0.75 0.60 0.91 1.18 0.39
(0.70) (0.72) (0.71) (0.77) (0.65)
12-months 1.41 1.07 1.47 1.99* 0.86
(1.14) (1.18) (1.23) (1.19) (0.98)
18-months 2.87** 2.56* 3.11** 3.10** 2.02*
(1.31) (1.34) (1.32) (1.46) (1.06)
24-months 4.31*** 4.37*** 4.97*** 4.33*** 2.67**
(1.50) (1.53) (1.47) (1.64) (1.19)
30-months 5.98*** 6.18*** 6.75*** 6.39*** 3.58***
(1.60) (1.63) (1.54) (1.68) (1.26)
36-months 6.74*** 7.24*** 7.90*** 8.00*** 4.12***
(1.63) (1.68) (1.52) (1.57) (1.25)
42-months 7.40*** 8.62*** 9.35*** 9.01*** 4.27***
(1.61) (1.66) (1.53) (1.50) (1.14)
48-months 7.04*** 9.00*** 9.84*** 8.82*** 4.14***
(1.68) (1.67) (1.67) (1.69) (1.11)
54-months 6.63*** 8.74*** 9.62*** 8.72*** 4.03***
(1.83) (1.78) (1.93) (1.98) (1.13)
60-months 5.98*** 8.29*** 9.19*** 8.29*** 3.92***
(1.97) (1.96) (2.18) (2.24) (1.21)
66-months 4.91** 7.58*** 8.28*** 6.82*** 3.78***
(2.03) (2.01) (2.23) (2.19) (1.25)
72-months 3.61* 6.49*** 7.02*** 4.81** 3.33***
(1.93) (1.83) (1.97) (2.14) (1.18)
78-months 2.54 5.48*** 5.74*** 3.10 2.50**
(1.77) (1.65) (1.79) (2.03) (1.08)
84-months 1.89 4.12** 4.21** 2.25 1.73*
(1.65) (1.62) (1.89) (1.95) (1.01)
90-months 0.93 2.55 2.54 1.42 1.09
(1.60) (1.61) (1.91) (1.92) (0.97)
96-months -0.06 1.14 1.22 0.46 0.40
(1.68) (1.76) (2.07) (2.03) (0.96)
102-months -0.41 0.29 0.61 0.13 -0.09
(1.74) (1.82) (2.15) (2.09) (1.06)
108-months -0.71 -0.42 0.05 -0.54 -0.59
(1.83) (1.87) (2.20) (2.16) (1.16)
114-months -0.88 -0.79 0.07 -0.60 -0.78
(1.89) (1.91) (2.25) (2.28) (1.20)
120-months -0.42 -0.42 0.65 -0.07 -0.83
(1.66) (1.66) (2.01) (2.02) (1.20)
Notes: Coefficient estimates on the relative yield curve slope St − S∗t from regression (12)—the augmented
UIP regression—a regression of the κ-period exchange rate change ∆κet+κ on the κ-period interest rate
differential it,κ−i∗t,κ, the relative yield curve slope and the relative yield curve curvature Ct−C∗t . Regressions
in columns (1) and (3)-(5) are estimated using pooled end-of-month data for six currencies—AUD, CAD,
CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD for different samples. Column (2) includes three additional
currencies—NOK, NZD and SEK—for zero-coupon government bond yield curve data is available prior to
the crisis. All regressions include country fixed effects. The panels are unbalanced and standard errors
(reported in parentheses) are constructed according to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. ∗, ∗∗
and ∗∗∗ denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 11: Slope coefficient estimates from augmented UIP regression for pooled regression and
country-specific regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Maturity Panel Australia Canada Switzerland Euro area Japan United
Kingdom
6-months 0.75 2.35 -0.06 -0.08 -0.41 3.04** 0.38
(0.70) (1.61) (1.06) (1.72) (1.23) (1.25) (1.15)
12-months 1.41 3.66 0.60 1.47 -1.18 4.68** 0.87
(1.14) (2.52) (1.63) (2.87) (2.09) (2.18) (1.69)
18-months 2.87** 6.45** 1.87 5.50 -1.90 4.90* 2.87
(1.31) (2.80) (1.89) (3.55) (2.69) (2.80) (2.02)
24-months 4.31*** 7.93** 2.17 9.41*** -1.85 5.01 5.46**
(1.50) (3.31) (2.29) (3.17) (3.23) (3.31) (2.39)
30-months 5.98*** 11.52*** 2.22 10.14*** -1.06 7.04** 7.87***
(1.60) (3.56) (2.61) (2.30) (3.63) (3.57) (2.56)
36-months 6.74*** 15.93*** 2.76 7.84*** 0.06 7.09* 9.17***
(1.63) (3.36) (2.68) (2.70) (4.05) (3.86) (2.49)
42-months 7.40*** 18.19*** 3.64 8.38** 0.89 6.46* 10.17***
(1.61) (3.29) (2.77) (3.35) (4.56) (3.69) (2.64)
48-months 7.04*** 17.55*** 4.05 7.94** 1.93 4.17 9.77***
(1.68) (3.85) (3.03) (3.72) (4.52) (3.44) (2.73)
54-months 6.63*** 16.08*** 3.83 7.17* 3.05 3.59 9.14***
(1.83) (4.11) (3.36) (4.12) (4.22) (3.29) (2.41)
60-months 5.98*** 15.22*** 3.97 5.36 3.68 3.95 7.81***
(1.97) (4.04) (3.69) (4.52) (3.93) (3.04) (2.09)
66-months 4.91** 13.17*** 2.89 4.33 3.32 3.63 6.24***
(2.03) (3.56) (4.01) (4.49) (3.49) (2.95) (1.98)
72-months 3.61* 10.16*** 1.69 3.38 2.26 2.64 4.85***
(1.93) (2.89) (4.17) (4.09) (3.08) (3.05) (1.78)
78-months 2.54 7.87*** 0.73 3.05 0.98 2.31 3.37**
(1.77) (2.96) (4.10) (3.49) (2.69) (3.05) (1.54)
84-months 1.89 5.80* 0.68 4.13 -0.81 3.88 2.03
(1.65) (3.11) (4.31) (2.86) (2.52) (2.92) (1.47)
90-months 0.93 4.61 0.66 3.42 -3.34 5.92** 0.21
(1.60) (3.43) (4.56) (2.70) (2.33) (2.71) (1.61)
96-months -0.06 3.24 1.71 2.00 -5.90*** 7.38*** -1.38
(1.68) (3.84) (4.78) (2.77) (2.23) (2.80) (1.73)
102-months -0.41 3.71 2.72 1.18 -6.51*** 8.22*** -2.44
(1.74) (4.10) (4.80) (2.81) (2.23) (2.70) (1.83)
108-months -0.71 3.05 3.73 0.03 -6.87*** 8.81*** -2.84
(1.83) (4.16) (4.79) (3.09) (2.27) (2.65) (1.91)
114-months -0.88 3.21 4.60 0.65 -7.46*** 9.96*** -3.62**
(1.89) (4.54) (4.92) (3.39) (2.47) (2.28) (1.60)
120-months -0.42 4.45 5.48 1.75 -7.63*** 8.63*** -2.29*
(1.66) (4.32) (4.68) (3.22) (2.39) (2.50) (1.32)
Notes: Coefficient estimates on the relative yield curve slope St − S∗t from regression (12)—the augmented UIP
regression—a regression of the κ-period exchange rate change ∆κet+κ on the κ-period interest rate differential
it,κ − i∗t,κ, the relative yield curve slope and the relative yield curve curvature Ct − C∗t . Regressions are estimated
using pooled end-of-month data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD
from 1980:01 to 2017:12. Column (1) presents coefficient estimates from a panel regression of all six countries,
including country fixed effects. The panel is unbalanced and standard errors (reported in parentheses) are con-
structed according to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. Columns (2)-(7) report coefficient estimates from
country-specific regressions. Newey and West (1987) standard errors (reported in parentheses) are constructed with
a maximum lag of 5. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance
levels, respectively.
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Table 12: Mean Excess Returns from Dynamic Long-Short Bond Portfolios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Holding Periods
6m 12m 18m 24m 30m 36m 42m 48m 54m 60m
Dollar-Bond Return Difference: rx
(κ),$
j,t,t+h − rx
(κ)
US,t,t+h
12m 1.95
18m 1.81 2.48
24m 1.70 2.38 3.04
30m 1.60 2.3 2.98 3.3
36m 1.49 2.21 2.92 3.26 3.30
42m 1.38 2.12 2.85 3.22 3.27 3.08
48m 1.26 2.01 2.76 3.16 3.24 3.06 2.9
54m 1.15 1.91 2.67 3.10 3.20 3.03 2.88 2.57
60m 1.03 1.81 2.58 3.03 3.15 2.99 2.85 2.55 2.30
66m 0.93 1.72 2.49 2.95 3.09 2.95 2.82 2.52 2.28 2.35
72m 0.83 1.63 2.40 2.88 3.03 2.89 2.77 2.49 2.25 2.32
78m 0.74 1.55 2.32 2.81 2.96 2.84 2.72 2.45 2.22 2.29
84m 0.67 1.48 2.24 2.74 2.90 2.78 2.67 2.41 2.18 2.26
90m 0.58 1.41 2.17 2.67 2.84 2.72 2.62 2.36 2.14 2.23
96m 0.51 1.35 2.09 2.60 2.78 2.65 2.56 2.31 2.10 2.19
102m 0.45 1.29 2.03 2.54 2.71 2.59 2.50 2.26 2.06 2.16
108m 0.39 1.23 1.96 2.48 2.65 2.53 2.44 2.21 2.02 2.12
114m 0.34 1.18 1.90 2.42 2.59 2.47 2.39 2.16 1.98 2.09
120m 0.29 1.12 1.84 2.36 2.53 2.41 2.33 2.11 1.94 2.05
Notes: Summary return statistics from investment strategies that go long in the Home-country bond and short in the US bond when the
Home yield curve slope is lower than the US yield curve slope, and go long in the US bond and short in the Home-country bond when
the Home yield curve slope is higher than the US yield curve slope. The table reports the mean US dollar-bond excess return difference
for different holding periods and different maturities. Returns are annualised and constructed using pooled end-of-month data for six
currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD for different country samples spanning 1980:01-2017:12.
B.3 Dynamic Portfolio Returns
In table 12, we present the mean return from a simple investment strategy that goes long the
Home bond and short the US bond when the Home yield curve slope is lower than the US yield
curve slope, and goes long the US bond and short the Home bond when the US yield curve slope
is lower than the foreign yield curve slope. Relative to Lustig et al. (2019), we present the mean
dollar-bond return differences for a range of holding periods h = 6, 12, ..., 60 and maturities
κ = 6, 12, ..., 120 (in months).
At the h = 6 holding period and κ = 120 maturity, most closely corresponding to Lustig
et al. (2019), the mean dollar-bond return difference is insignificantly different from zero due
to offsetting currency and local currency bond returns. But, away from this point, table 12
demonstrates that dollar-bond return differences are non-zero and, for given hold periods, have
a tent-shaped pattern across maturities, supporting evidence of the yield curve slope’s predictive
role for returns due to business cycle risk.
B.4 Liquidity Yield-Augmented Regressions
In this appendix, we demonstrate that our results regarding liquidity yields, presented in sec-
tion 4.1 using excess return regressions, also hold true when extending the UIP regression. The
excess return regressions presented in the main body of the paper are our preferred empirical
specification in the case of liquidity yields due to data constraints that heighten worries around
the pervasiveness of non-overlapping observations for inference in longer-horizon UIP regres-
sions. Nevertheless, in this appendix, we demonstrate that point estimates from an extended
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Table 13: Coefficient estimates from extended UIP regression, with relative yield curve slope
and curvature and horizon-specific liquidity yield as additional regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
UIP Regression Yld. Curve-Augmented Liq. Yld. & Yld. Curve-Augmented
Mat. iκ − i∗κ R2 iκ − i∗κ S − S∗ C − C∗ R2 iκ − i∗κ S − S∗ C − C∗ ηκ R2
12m -0.78 0.012 1.61 4.35** -4.11* 0.037 1.67 4.25** -3.66* -0.05 0.045
(0.76) (1.29) (1.79) (2.12) (1.31) (1.77) (2.05) (0.03)
24m -0.59 0.016 0.73 4.59** -4.51** 0.039 0.59 3.63** -2.89 -0.09** 0.057
(0.53) (0.75) (1.82) (2.18) (0.77) (1.74) (2.12) (0.04)
36m -0.13 0.011 1.49*** 7.78*** -7.97*** 0.066 1.33** 5.77*** -4.26** -0.17*** 0.123
(0.40) (0.57) (1.85) (2.24) (0.61) (1.64) (2.00) (0.04)
60m 1.25*** 0.097 2.30*** 7.76*** -7.37*** 0.155 2.06*** 5.99*** -3.40 -0.20*** 0.207
(0.32) (0.21) (2.01) (2.47) (0.26) (1.95) (2.58) (0.03)
84m 1.35*** 0.161 1.60*** 2.45 1.17 0.185 1.32*** 1.53 4.21 -0.23*** 0.235
(0.21) (0.19) (2.02) (2.73) (0.19) (1.92) (2.71) (0.06)
120m 0.59*** 0.169 0.64*** 2.81 -1.97 0.179 -0.04 1.19 1.64 -0.56*** 0.420
(0.22) (0.22) (2.27) (3.21) (0.19) (1.60) (2.56) (0.07)
Notes: Coefficient estimates and adjusted R2 (R
2
) from regression (7) (UIP regression), (12) (yield curve-augmented UIP regression)
and (32) (liquidity yield and yield curve-augmented UIP regression). Regressions are estimated using pooled end-of-month data for six
currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD over a common sample (1991:04 to 2017:12), defined by the
availability of liquidity yields. Regressions estimated using panel data for all six countries, including country fixed effects. The panel
is unbalanced and standard errors (reported in parentheses) are constructed according to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
UIP regression deliver similar results to those in section 4.1.
Using the definition of the κ-horizon liquidity premium for a κ-horizon US government bond
relative to an equivalent-maturity government bond yield in country j, ηRj,t,κ, we estimate an
extended UIP regression:
ej,t+κ − ej,t = β1,κ
(
ij,t,κ − i∗t,κ
)
+ β2,κ(Sj,t − S∗t ) + β3,κ(Cj,t − C∗t ) + β4,κηRj,t,κ + uj,t+κ (32)
Unlike Engel and Wu (2018), we assess the importance of the relative liquidity yield at a range
of horizons, rather than just the 1-year tenor. Doing so provides additional novel insights, while
also demonstrating the independent importance of yield curve factors and business cycle risk.
The central hypothesis in Engel and Wu (2018) is that because liquidity is attractive to investors,
an increase in a country’s relative liquidity yield should ceteris paribus appreciate a currency
today and, this, result in an expected depreciation in the future. Given the definition of ηRj,t,κ
as the relative liquidity of US Treasuries vis-a`-vis other countries, this implies a hypothesised
β4,κ < 0 in regression (32).
The results are presented in table 13, comparing the liquidity yield and yield curve-augmented
regression (7) with the baseline UIP regression (7) and the yield curve-augmented regression
(12) over a common sample.
The most important observation, consistent with the central claim of our paper that the
relative slope captures a business cycle risk component of ERRP, is that the coefficient on the
relative yield curve slope is robust to the additional inclusion of liquidity yields as a regressor
in (32). This is seen by comparing columns (4) and (8) of table 13. The loading on the
relative slope remains tent-shaped with respect to maturity, peaking here at the 5-year tenor
and declining to insignificant values at the 7 and 10-year tenors.
Consistent with the findings in Engel and Wu (2018), the inclusion of the relative liquidity
yield substantially improves the fit for exchange rates. At all horizons, the adjusted R2 of the
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regression (32) exceeds that of (7) and (12). This provides additional evidence to complement
the results in Engel and Wu (2018), showing that the relevance of convenience yields is important
at all horizons. In addition, the largest increase in R
2
from liquidity yields comes at the 10-year
horizon, suggesting that liquidity yields most strongly influence longer-horizon exchange rate
dynamics. The coefficient estimates in column (10) support this. Consistent with the hypothesis
that a more liquid currency should appreciate contemporaneously, depreciating subsequently,
our results suggest that this phenomenon especially powerful a medium to long horizons. In
particular, β4,κ estimates are significantly negative from the 2-year horizon and beyond, growing
in magnitude with respect to tenor. The negative coefficients can be interpreted in the following
way: an increase in ηRj,t,κ represents higher perceived relative liquidity for US Treasuries, placing
contemporaneous appreciation pressure on the dollar and vice versa for country-j currency.
B.5 Yield Curve Inversion Interactions
In this Appendix, we document the robustness of our results in section 5. For reference figure
9 plots country-by-country time series of the 6-month interest rate differential and 6-month
exchange rate change, vis-a`-vis the USD, for the 6 currencies in our benchmark sample. In
turn, domestic yield curve inversions are indicated by shaded areas in the figure. In some cases,
the GBP especially, there is visible evidence of changes in short-horizon exchange rate dynamics
during inversion periods—e.g. there is a broadly negative relationship between UK-US interest
rate differentials and the exchange rate during the mid-2000s, which turns positive during the
global financial crisis.
Persistence of Yield Curve Inversion Indicator In the main body of the paper, our
benchmark inversion indicator 1j,t is set to unity in months where the domestic (country-j)
yield curve is inverted, and zero otherwise. Insofar, as the inversion captures a change in
expectations of future growth that are subsequently realised, then the change in exchange rate
dynamics around inversions may be expected to persist, even after the inversion has ended.
In tables 14 and 15 we present robustness analyses in which the inversion indicator 1j,t is
set to unity during a domestic inversion and for 1 and 2 years after it ends, respectively. The
two tables demonstrate that our baseline result—a reversal in short-horizon UIP dynamics—is
robust to this redefinition of the inversion indicator.
Additional Inversion Interactions with Relative Yield Curve Slope and Curvature
In our benchmark analysis in section 5, we study only the interaction between the yield curve
inversion and the UIP coefficient. Our benchmark regression controls for the relative yield
curve slope and curvature, but does not additionally include their interaction with the inversion
indicator.
In table 16, we demonstrate that our headline result—a reversal in short-horizon UIP
dynamics—is broadly robust to adding these additional interactions to the regression. The
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Figure 9: Time series of 6-month interest rate differentials and exchange rate changes
alongside domestic yield curve inversions
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Notes: Red lines denote 6-month zero-coupon bond yield differential vis-a`-vis the US in percentage points. Blue
lines denote 6-month exchange rate changes vis-a`-vis the USD in percent. The gray shaded areas denote periods
in which the domestic yield curve was inverted.
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Table 14: Coefficient estimates from UIP regressions with additional yield curve inversion
interactions, with inversion indicator persisting for 1-year after end of each inversion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UIP Regression Augmented Regression
iκ − i∗κ 1× (iκ − i∗κ) iκ − i∗κ 1× (iκ − i∗κ) S − S∗ C − C∗
6-months -1.63** 8.42*** -0.10 7.95*** 1.37* -1.15
(0.72) (1.89) (1.12) (1.98) (0.74) (1.05)
12-months -1.69*** 6.09*** -0.43 5.91*** 2.00 -1.19
(0.60) (1.20) (0.95) (1.33) (1.28) (1.80)
18-months -1.49*** 3.60*** 0.14 3.48*** 3.63** -1.89
(0.57) (0.88) (0.88) (0.97) (1.63) (2.12)
24-months -1.18** 2.17*** 0.50 2.02** 4.94*** -3.13
(0.53) (0.77) (0.79) (0.88) (1.86) (2.41)
30-months -0.84* 1.31* 1.08 1.06 6.95*** -5.37**
(0.46) (0.69) (0.68) (0.80) (1.93) (2.60)
36-months -0.54 0.85 1.47*** 0.49 8.52*** -7.64***
(0.38) (0.60) (0.56) (0.66) (1.71) (2.25)
42-months -0.14 0.79 1.86*** 0.33 9.78*** -10.10***
(0.39) (0.58) (0.45) (0.60) (1.59) (2.16)
48-months 0.36 0.39 2.17*** -0.06 9.85*** -10.52***
(0.41) (0.52) (0.34) (0.50) (1.68) (2.32)
54-months 0.81** 0.19 2.45*** -0.22 9.88*** -10.40***
(0.40) (0.46) (0.25) (0.44) (1.88) (2.37)
60-months 1.14*** 0.29 2.57*** -0.07 9.56*** -9.82***
(0.36) (0.39) (0.22) (0.38) (2.08) (2.57)
66-months 1.38*** 0.18 2.49*** -0.03 7.95*** -6.73**
(0.31) (0.37) (0.22) (0.36) (2.23) (2.73)
72-months 1.56*** 0.01 2.35*** -0.03 5.79*** -2.39
(0.24) (0.37) (0.23) (0.34) (2.17) (2.62)
78-months 1.54*** 0.24 2.05*** 0.26 3.95* -0.22
(0.22) (0.38) (0.22) (0.36) (2.07) (2.62)
84-months 1.50*** 0.47 1.84*** 0.51 3.04 0.12
(0.21) (0.44) (0.20) (0.44) (1.99) (2.70)
90-months 1.48*** 0.58 1.70*** 0.63 2.39 0.50
(0.20) (0.44) (0.20) (0.45) (1.96) (2.85)
96-months 1.40*** 0.56 1.54*** 0.67 1.61 2.25
(0.21) (0.37) (0.20) (0.40) (1.99) (2.91)
102-months 1.28*** 0.38 1.41*** 0.48 1.89 2.03
(0.22) (0.32) (0.22) (0.36) (1.91) (2.76)
108-months 1.09*** 0.23 1.17*** 0.34 1.24 2.69
(0.22) (0.31) (0.22) (0.36) (1.99) (2.81)
114-months 0.90*** 0.38 0.97*** 0.55* 0.60 4.42
(0.22) (0.25) (0.21) (0.31) (2.11) (3.41)
120-months 0.77*** 0.09 0.83*** 0.18 1.38 3.28
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.25) (1.83) (3.42)
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present estimates from a regression the κ-period exchange rate change on the κ-period interest
rate differential ij,κ − i∗κ, a dummy variable indicator for country-j yield curve inversions 1j and an interaction between
the two 1j ×
(
ij,κ − i∗κ
)
. Columns (3)-(6) present estimates from the same regression with two additional regressors,
the relative yield curve slope Sj − S∗ and curvature Cj − C∗. The inversion indicator 1j is set to 1 in months where
the country-j yield curve slope is negative and remains 1 for 1-year after the end of each inversion, and zero otherwise.
Regressions are estimated using pooled end-of-month data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-
a`-vis the USD from 1992:07 to 2017:12. All regressions include country fixed effects. The panel is balanced and standard
errors (reported in parentheses) are constructed according to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 15: Coefficient estimates from UIP regressions with additional yield curve inversion
interactions, with inversion indicator persisting for 2-years after end of each inversion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UIP Regression Augmented Regression
iκ − i∗κ 1× (iκ − i∗κ) iκ − i∗κ 1× (iκ − i∗κ) S − S∗ C − C∗
6-months -1.59** 8.37*** -0.37 7.92*** 1.14 -1.08
(0.72) (1.87) (1.14) (1.97) (0.76) (1.04)
12-months -1.65*** 5.77*** -0.59 5.58*** 1.70 -1.15
(0.60) (1.21) (0.97) (1.34) (1.32) (1.77)
18-months -1.46*** 3.39*** -0.01 3.22*** 3.25* -1.85
(0.56) (0.86) (0.90) (0.96) (1.68) (2.10)
24-months -1.17** 2.19*** 0.35 1.98** 4.49** -3.03
(0.51) (0.74) (0.79) (0.83) (1.87) (2.35)
30-months -0.85* 1.52** 0.94 1.21* 6.50*** -5.23**
(0.44) (0.66) (0.67) (0.72) (1.91) (2.50)
36-months -0.54 0.92 1.40** 0.50 8.27*** -7.62***
(0.37) (0.59) (0.55) (0.60) (1.69) (2.18)
42-months -0.13 0.75 1.82*** 0.23 9.60*** -10.21***
(0.39) (0.56) (0.45) (0.53) (1.58) (2.10)
48-months 0.37 0.34 2.15*** -0.17 9.73*** -10.67***
(0.41) (0.50) (0.34) (0.45) (1.68) (2.24)
54-months 0.81** 0.25 2.42*** -0.24 9.72*** -10.50***
(0.39) (0.43) (0.24) (0.37) (1.89) (2.29)
60-months 1.13*** 0.33 2.54*** -0.12 9.39*** -9.99***
(0.36) (0.40) (0.21) (0.34) (2.09) (2.48)
66-months 1.38*** 0.11 2.49*** -0.24 7.86*** -7.00***
(0.31) (0.41) (0.22) (0.34) (2.24) (2.63)
72-months 1.56*** 0.01 2.35*** -0.23 5.78*** -2.67
(0.24) (0.43) (0.23) (0.36) (2.19) (2.58)
78-months 1.54*** 0.14 2.05*** -0.01 3.97* -0.64
(0.22) (0.43) (0.22) (0.39) (2.11) (2.58)
84-months 1.50*** 0.23 1.84*** 0.13 3.12 -0.46
(0.21) (0.43) (0.21) (0.43) (2.05) (2.68)
90-months 1.48*** 0.32 1.72*** 0.24 2.58 -0.13
(0.21) (0.41) (0.21) (0.43) (2.03) (2.78)
96-months 1.39*** 0.22 1.56*** 0.18 1.95 1.27
(0.22) (0.36) (0.22) (0.40) (2.06) (2.78)
102-months 1.26*** 0.07 1.41*** 0.02 2.24 0.69
(0.23) (0.32) (0.23) (0.36) (2.03) (2.66)
108-months 1.07*** 0.05 1.16*** 0.04 1.46 1.76
(0.24) (0.29) (0.23) (0.33) (2.09) (2.70)
114-months 0.90*** 0.05 0.97*** 0.07 0.95 3.08
(0.23) (0.26) (0.22) (0.30) (2.23) (3.35)
120-months 0.76*** -0.14 0.84*** -0.20 1.80 2.18
(0.22) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (1.94) (3.34)
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present estimates from a regression the κ-period exchange rate change on the κ-period interest
rate differential ij,κ − i∗κ, a dummy variable indicator for country-j yield curve inversions 1j and an interaction between
the two 1j ×
(
ij,κ − i∗κ
)
. Columns (3)-(6) present estimates from the same regression with two additional regressors,
the relative yield curve slope Sj − S∗ and curvature Cj − C∗. The inversion indicator 1j is set to 1 in months where
the country-j yield curve slope is negative and remains 1 for 2-years after the end of each inversion, and zero otherwise.
Regressions are estimated using pooled end-of-month data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-
a`-vis the USD from 1992:07 to 2017:12. All regressions include country fixed effects. The panel is balanced and standard
errors (reported in parentheses) are constructed according to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denote statistically significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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coefficients on the slope-inversion interaction reveal that, while the tent shape relationship be-
tween exchange rates and the relative slope persists, it is weaker during inversion periods.
Sample Stability In table 17, we assess the robustness of our findings to sample period. In
particular, column (6) shows that when the 1992:07-2017:12 is shortened to exclude the global
financial crisis, ending in 2008:06, the interaction coefficient remains significant and of opposite
sign at short horizons.
Columns (2) and (4) demonstrate significant differences in short-horizon UIP coefficients
when the sample is extended to begin in 1980:01, although differences are quantitatively smaller.
This weakening in the extent of the UIP switch in the 1980s may be linked to a time-varying
relationship between disasters and inflation dynamics.
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Table 16: Coefficient estimates from UIP regressions with additional yield curve inversion
interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iκ − i∗κ 1× (iκ − i∗κ) S − S∗ 1×(S − S∗) C − C∗ 1×(C − C∗)
6-months 0.45 4.70 1.96*** -5.70*** -1.74* 5.69***
(1.08) (3.83) (0.71) (1.71) (1.02) (2.10)
12-months 0.02 4.36** 2.99** -9.02*** -2.18 11.69***
(0.90) (1.98) (1.19) (2.56) (1.72) (2.80)
18-months 0.45 3.09** 4.56*** -8.04*** -2.89 12.95***
(0.83) (1.45) (1.49) (3.03) (2.08) (3.14)
24-months 0.83 2.03* 6.05*** -7.77** -4.39* 15.37***
(0.76) (1.12) (1.75) (3.19) (2.35) (4.53)
30-months 1.33** 0.98 7.98*** -6.98** -6.47** 13.50***
(0.67) (0.80) (1.82) (2.96) (2.56) (4.79)
36-months 1.64*** -0.32 9.38*** -7.32** -8.63*** 10.98**
(0.55) (0.77) (1.60) (2.86) (2.23) (4.92)
42-months 1.96*** -0.61 10.43*** -6.24* -10.73*** 7.02
(0.45) (0.74) (1.53) (3.30) (2.27) (5.74)
48-months 2.18*** -1.11* 10.46*** -7.76** -10.79*** 5.53
(0.36) (0.58) (1.68) (3.19) (2.49) (5.57)
54-months 2.45*** -1.43*** 10.70*** -10.61*** -10.86*** 8.36
(0.27) (0.49) (1.90) (3.33) (2.70) (5.63)
60-months 2.59*** -1.11** 10.44*** -10.55*** -10.27*** 9.00
(0.23) (0.44) (2.10) (3.29) (2.92) (5.68)
66-months 2.50*** -0.57 8.74*** -9.43*** -7.00** 9.25*
(0.23) (0.36) (2.26) (3.04) (3.01) (5.57)
72-months 2.31*** -0.45 6.24*** -6.53** -2.17 3.85
(0.23) (0.31) (2.21) (2.82) (2.96) (5.77)
78-months 1.98*** -0.01 4.16* -4.08 0.51 -1.27
(0.23) (0.34) (2.13) (2.68) (2.98) (5.95)
84-months 1.71*** 0.32 3.26 -4.09 1.37 -4.63
(0.21) (0.37) (2.06) (2.60) (3.07) (5.76)
90-months 1.55*** 0.56 2.68 -5.01* 1.81 -4.46
(0.19) (0.43) (2.01) (2.59) (3.19) (5.64)
96-months 1.40*** 0.71* 1.86 -5.64** 3.22 -0.78
(0.20) (0.43) (2.11) (2.81) (3.48) (5.39)
102-months 1.29*** 0.65* 2.02 -5.86* 2.83 2.73
(0.22) (0.38) (2.05) (3.20) (3.24) (5.85)
108-months 1.08*** 0.50 1.67 -8.91*** 3.17 8.52
(0.21) (0.35) (2.08) (3.15) (3.17) (6.09)
114-months 0.91*** 0.68** 1.67 -9.26*** 3.02 11.52*
(0.20) (0.32) (2.11) (2.78) (3.44) (5.99)
120-months 0.81*** 0.42 1.95 -6.64*** 2.20 10.24*
(0.19) (0.27) (1.83) (2.34) (3.18) (5.69)
Notes: Coefficient estimates from a regression the κ-period exchange rate change on the κ-period interest rate differential
ij,κ − i∗κ, the relative yield curve slope Sj − S∗, the relative yield curve curvature Cj − C∗, a dummy variable indicator
for country-j yield curve inversions 1j and interactions between the inversion indicator and other regressors. The inversion
indicator 1j is set to 1 in months where the country-j yield curve slope is negative, and zero otherwise. Regressions are
estimated using pooled end-of-month data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD
from 1992:07 to 2017:12. All regressions include country fixed effects. The panel is balanced and standard errors (reported
in parentheses) are constructed according to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistically
significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 17: Coefficient estimates from UIP regressions with additional yield curve inversion
interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample 1980:01-2017:12 1980:01-2008:06 1992:07-2008:06
iκ − i∗κ 1× (iκ − i∗κ) iκ − i∗κ 1× (iκ − i∗κ) iκ − i∗κ 1× (iκ − i∗κ)
6-months -1.87*** 1.76* -2.77*** 2.21** -2.93*** 10.08***
(0.58) (1.05) (0.62) (0.94) (0.77) (1.58)
12-months -1.59*** 1.66** -2.50*** 2.30*** -3.28*** 9.32***
(0.50) (0.78) (0.52) (0.74) (0.59) (0.88)
18-months -1.21** 0.86 -2.09*** 1.45** -3.00*** 6.15***
(0.48) (0.67) (0.50) (0.65) (0.57) (0.77)
24-months -0.83* 0.25 -1.66*** 0.79 -2.62*** 4.18***
(0.45) (0.57) (0.45) (0.54) (0.51) (0.66)
30-months -0.53 -0.08 -1.32*** 0.42 -2.16*** 2.98***
(0.41) (0.52) (0.40) (0.49) (0.40) (0.54)
36-months -0.22 -0.25 -0.98*** 0.20 -1.76*** 1.95***
(0.38) (0.53) (0.36) (0.50) (0.34) (0.55)
42-months 0.08 -0.24 -0.66* 0.20 -1.31*** 1.69***
(0.37) (0.50) (0.35) (0.46) (0.38) (0.56)
48-months 0.39 -0.25 -0.30 0.16 -0.73* 1.30**
(0.36) (0.47) (0.34) (0.43) (0.43) (0.52)
54-months 0.72** -0.24 0.14 0.12 -0.07 0.82*
(0.33) (0.42) (0.32) (0.39) (0.45) (0.49)
60-months 0.94*** -0.12 0.45 0.17 0.43 0.60
(0.30) (0.37) (0.31) (0.35) (0.44) (0.47)
66-months 1.14*** -0.11 0.75*** 0.12 0.81** 0.55
(0.27) (0.32) (0.29) (0.31) (0.38) (0.40)
72-months 1.32*** -0.20 1.03*** 0.00 1.16*** 0.28
(0.23) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.31) (0.39)
78-months 1.37*** -0.24 1.18*** -0.12 1.29*** 0.31
(0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.19) (0.29) (0.40)
84-months 1.32*** -0.26 1.23*** -0.20 1.42*** 0.57
(0.18) (0.17) (0.20) (0.16) (0.28) (0.47)
90-months 1.25*** -0.27* 1.21*** -0.23 1.49*** 0.79
(0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.25) (0.49)
96-months 1.10*** -0.21 1.08*** -0.20 1.42*** 0.78*
(0.17) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.24) (0.44)
102-months 0.91*** -0.07 0.90*** -0.07 1.29*** 0.59
(0.18) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.23) (0.38)
108-months 0.75*** 0.04 0.75*** 0.03 1.10*** 0.44
(0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.22) (0.36)
114-months 0.65*** 0.13 0.65*** 0.13 0.90*** 0.54**
(0.17) (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.22) (0.27)
120-months 0.63*** 0.05 0.63*** 0.05 0.77*** 0.21
(0.17) (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.19) (0.24)
Notes: Coefficient estimates from a regression the κ-period exchange rate change on the κ-period interest rate differential
ij,κ−i∗κ, a dummy variable indicator for country-j yield curve inversions 1j and interactions between the two. The inversion
indicator 1j is set to 1 in months where the country-j yield curve slope is negative, and zero otherwise. Regressions are
estimated using pooled end-of-month data for six currencies—AUD, CAD, CHF, EUR, JPY and GBP—vis-a`-vis the USD.
All regressions include country fixed effects. Coefficients in columns (1) and (2) are estimated on a 1980:01-2017:12 sample,
an unbalanced panel. Coefficients in columns (3) and (4) are estimated on a 1980:01-2008:06 sample, an unbalanced panel.
Coefficients in columns (5) and (6) are estimated on a 1992:07-2008:06 sample, a balanced panel. Standard errors (reported
in parentheses) are constructed according to the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) methodology. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistically
significant point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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C Additional Derivations
C.1 Derivation of Exchange Rate Risk Premia λt,κ
Use the definition of the κ-period ex post ERRP from the perspective of the Home agent (8).
From (6), this is equal to λHt,κ = −covt (mt,t+κ,∆κet+κ).
For the Foreign agent, with SDF M∗t,κ, an analogous cross-border no-arbitrage condition can
be attained, satisfying
1 = Et
[
M∗t,t+κ
Et
Et+κRt,κ
]
, 1 = Et
[
M∗t,t+κR
∗
t,κ
]
Assuming Et and M∗t,κ are jointly log-normally distributed, international no-arbitrage requires
Et [∆
κet+κ]− 1
2
vart (−∆κet+κ) =
(
it,κ − i∗t,κ
)
+ covt
(
m∗t,t+κ,−∆κet+κ
)
From the representative Foreign agent’s perspective, the κ-period ex post excess return from
engaging in international asset trade is defined as λFt,κ = −covt
(
m∗t,t+κ,−∆κet+κ
)
.
Engel (2014) emphasises that standard empirical models do not measure λHt,κ or λ
F
t,κ, but
instead provide more direct evidence on
λt,κ ≡
λHt,κ − λFt,κ
2
=
1
2
[−covt (mt,t+κ,∆κet+κ) + covt (m∗t,t+κ,−∆κet+κ)]
=
1
2
[−covt (mt,t+κ,∆κet+κ)− covt (m∗t,t+κ,∆κet+κ)]
= −1
2
covt
(
mt,t+κ +m
∗
t,t+κ,∆
κet+κ
)
= −covt
(
mt,t+κ +m
∗
t,t+κ
2
,∆κet+κ
)
(C.1.1)
replicating (9) in the main body.
C.2 Derivations for Example 1
In Example 1, we specify that the (log) pricing kernel of the Home (Foreign) agent ν
(∗)
t ≡
log V
(∗)
t , where m
(∗)
t,t+κ ≡ ν(∗)t+κ−ν(∗)t , follows a mean-zero first-order autoregressive process, with
persistence parameter ρ
(∗)
ν ∈ (0, 1):
ν
(∗)
t = ρ
(∗)
ν ν
(∗)
t−1 + ε
(∗)
ν,t , ε
(∗)
ν,t ∼ N
(
0, σ(∗)ν
)
(C.2.1)
where σ
(∗)
ν > 0. Note that this pricing kernel is stationary, implying that ν
(∗)
t contains some
transitory component ν
(∗)
t
T ≡ log V (∗)t
T
.
To derive our result—an analytical relationship between the ERRP λt,κ and the relative
cross-country yield curve slope SRt —we use two ingredients. First, by using the specific func-
tional form for the (log) pricing kernel (C.2.1), the ex post κ-period ERRP under complete
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markets (10) can be written as
λt,κ =
1
2
[
vart (mt,t+κ)− vart
(
m∗t,t+κ
)]
=
1
2
[
vart (νt+κ − νt)− vart
(
ν∗t+κ − ν∗t
)]
=
1
2
[
vart (νt+κ)− vart
(
ν∗t+κ
)]
=
1
2
[
vart
(
ρ(κ−1)ν νt+1 +
κ−1∑
i=0
ρiνεν,t+κ−i
)
− vart
(
ρ∗ν
(κ−1)ν∗t+1 +
κ−1∑
i=0
ρ∗ν
iε∗ν,t+κ−i
)]
=
1
2
[
ρ2(κ−1)ν vart (νt+1)− ρ∗ν2(κ−1)vart
(
ν∗t+1
)]
(C.2.2)
where line 2 uses the definition of the log SDF and the log pricing kernels mt,t+κ ≡ νt+κ − νt,
line 3 conditions on information available at time t, line 4 uses a backward iteration of ν
(∗)
t+κ in
terms of ν
(∗)
t+1, and line 5 expands this by conditioning on information at time t. In addition, if
ρν = ρ
∗
ν , then (C.2.2) can be rewritten as
λt,κ =
1
2
ρ2(κ−1)ν
[
vart (νt+1)− vart
(
ν∗t+1
)]
(C.2.3)
This expression captures the intuition that, under complete markets, the ERRP is determined
by the relative variance of countries’ pricing kernels.
Second, the expression for the slope of a given yield curve (14), can be re-expressed given
the AR(1) (log) pricing kernel (C.2.1).50 For the Home country the yield curve slope St can
approximately be expressed as:
St ≈ Et [rxt+1,n] = −covt
(
mt,t+1,Et+1
n−1∑
i=1
mt+i,t+i+1
)
= −covt (νt+1 − νt,Et+1 [νt+n − νt+1])
= vart (νt+1)− covt (νt+1,Et+1 [νt+n])
= vart (νt+1)− covt
(
νt+1,Et+1
[
ρ(n−1)ν νt+1 +
n−1∑
i=0
ρiνεν,t+n−i
])
=
(
1− ρ(n−1)ν
)
vart (νt+1) (C.2.4)
where line 2 uses the definition of the log SDF and the log pricing kernels mt,t+κ ≡ νt+κ−νt, line
3 conditions on information available at time t+ 1 to break-up the expectation and information
available at time t to simplify the covariance, line 4 uses a backward iteration of νt+n in terms
of νt+1, and line 5 expands this and simplifies the resulting expression. The expression captures
the intuition that the slope of the yield curve reflects the autocovariance of a representative
investor’s intertemporal consumption valuation, albeit simplified with an AR(1) specification of
pricing kernels.
50In this derivation, we ignore the Jensen’s inequality term for − 1
2
vart (pt+1,n−1) in (14).
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An analogous expression to (C.2.4) can be derived for the Foreign representative investors,
and together these yield the following expression for the relative yield curve slope SRt
SRt ≡ St − S∗t =
(
1− ρ(n−1)ν
)
vart (νt+1)−
(
1− ρ∗ν (n−1)
)
vart
(
ν∗t+1
)
(C.2.5)
which, when ρν = ρ
∗
ν , can be written as
SRt ≡ St − S∗t =
(
1− ρ(n−1)ν
) [
vart (νt+1)− vart
(
ν∗t+1
)]
(C.2.6)
Comparing the expression for the ex post ERRP under symmetry (C.2.3) and the expression
for the relative cross-country yield curve slope (C.2.6), the two have the following analytical
relationship:
λt,κ =
1
2
ρ
2(κ−1)
ν
1− ρ(n−1)ν
SRt (C.2.7)
where, when ρν ∈ (0, 1) and κ, n > 1, ρ2(κ−1)ν /(1− ρ(n−1)ν ) > 0, such that
∂λt,κ
∂SRt
> 0
implying that a steeper Home yield curve is associated with a Home exchange rate depreciation
over time and, thus, an increase in the ex post ERRP on Foreign currency.
C.3 Derivations for Example 2
In Example 2, we specify that the (log) pricing kernel of the Home (Foreign) agent ν
(∗)
t follows
a mean-zero second-order autoregressive process:
ν
(∗)
t = ρ
(∗)
1,νν
(∗)
t−1 + ρ
(∗)
2,ν + ε
(∗)
ν,t , ε
(∗)
ν,t ∼ N
(
0, σ(∗)ν
)
(C.3.1)
where σ
(∗)
ν > 0.
For simplicity, we impose that ρ1,ν = ρ
(∗)
1,ν and ρ2,ν = ρ
(∗)
2,ν . Defining L as the lag operator,
(C.3.1) can be rewritten as
ρ(L)ν
(∗)
t ≡
(
1− ρ1,νL− ρ2,νL2
)
ν
(∗)
t = ε
(∗)
ν,t (C.3.2)
which we define to be stationary, such that ν
(∗)
t contains some transitory component—i.e. the
roots of the characteristic equation, C(x) = 1− ρ1,νx− ρ2,νx2 = 0, lie outside of the unit circle.
Using the Wold decomposition theorem, (C.3.2) can be written as
νt =
∞∑
i=0
ψiε
(∗)
ν,t−i ≡ ψ(L)ε(∗)ν,t
where, for an AR(2) process, ψ1 = ρ1,ν , ψ2 = ρ1,νψ1 + ρ2,ν and ψi = ρ1,νψi−1 + ρ2,νψi−2 for
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i ≥ 3. For a given lag `, then
νt = ψ`νt−` +
`−1∑
i=0
ψiεν,t−i (C.3.3)
Combining (C.3.3) with (10), the ex post κ-period ERRP under complete markets can be
written as:
λt,κ =
1
2
[
vart (mt,t+κ)− vart
(
m∗t,t+κ
)]
=
1
2
[
vart (νt+κ − νt)− vart
(
ν∗t+κ − ν∗t
)]
=
1
2
[
vart (νt+κ)− vart
(
ν∗t+κ
)]
=
1
2
[
vart
(
ψκ−1νt+1 +
κ−2∑
i=0
ψiεν,t+κ−i
)
− vart
(
ψκ−1ν∗t+1 +
κ−2∑
i=0
ψiε
∗
ν,t+κ−i
)]
=
1
2
ψ2κ−1
[
vart (νt+1)− vart
(
ν∗t+1
)]
(C.3.4)
where line 2 uses the definition of the log SDF and the log pricing kernels mt,t+κ ≡ νt+κ − νt,
line 3 conditions on information available at time t, line 4 uses a backward iteration of ν
(∗)
t+κ
in terms of ν
(∗)
t+1, and line 5 expands this by conditioning on information at time t. The final
expression captures the intuition that, under complete markets, the ERRP is determined by
the relative variance of countries’ pricing kernels.
The expression for the slope of a given yield curve (14), can be re-expressed given the AR(2)
(log) pricing kernel (C.3.3). For the Home country the yield curve slope St can approximately
be expressed as:
St ≈ Et [rxt+1,n] = −covt
(
mt,t+1,Et+1
n−1∑
i=1
mt+i,t+i+1
)
= −covt (νt+1 − νt,Et+1 [νt+n − νt+1])
= vart (νt+1)− covt (νt+1,Et+1 [νt+n])
= vart (νt+1)− covt
(
νt+1,Et+1
[
ψn−1νt+1 +
n−2∑
i=0
ψiεν,t+n−i
])
= (1− ψn−1) vart (νt+1) (C.3.5)
where line 2 uses the definition of the log SDF and the log pricing kernels mt,t+κ ≡ νt+κ−νt, line
3 conditions on information available at time t+ 1 to break-up the expectation and information
available at time t to simplify the covariance, line 4 uses a backward iteration of νt+n in terms
of νt+1, and line 5 expands this and simplifies the resulting expression. The expression captures
the intuition that the slope of the yield curve reflects the autocovariance of a representative
investor’s intertemporal consumption valuation with an AR(2) specification of pricing kernels.
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The relative slope under symmetry is therefore
SRt ≡ St − S∗t = (1− ψn−1)
[
vart (νt+1)− vart
(
ν∗t+1
)]
(C.3.6)
Comparing the expression for the ex post ERRP under symmetry (C.3.4) and the relative
cross-country yield curve slope (C.3.6), the two have the following analytical relationship:
λt,κ =
1
2
ψ2κ−1
1− ψn−1S
R
t (C.2.7)
where, when ψn−1 ∈ (0, 1) and κ, n > 1, ψ2κ−1/(1− ψn−1) > 0, such that
∂λt,κ
∂SRt
> 0
implying that a steeper Home yield curve is associated with a Home exchange rate depreciation
over time and, thus, an increase in the ex post ERRP on Foreign currency.
C.4 Further Derivations for Section 4.2
Consider a decomposition of the Home (Foreign) SDF M
(∗)
t,t+κ into a valuation of pecuniary
returns M
r(∗)
t,t+κ and a valuation for liquidity M
`(∗)
t,t+κ:
M
(∗)
t,t+κ = M
r(∗)
t,t+κM
`(∗)
t,t+κ, (33)
where M
(∗)
t,t+κ = M
r(∗)
t,t+κ if there is no role for liquidity. M
`(∗)
t,t+κ captures the price of liquidity
at time t, which is both investor-specific and asset-specific. In a similar way that we consider
return valuation to vary across time due to a stochastic sequence of consumption or wealth,
we can assume the investor receives a stochastic endowment of liquidity. First, the liquidity
component of the pricing kernel is higher in periods when the investor is liquidity constrained.
Second, the pricing kernel of a given investor can differ across assets now as they vary in the
liquidity services they provide. For example, a Home representative investor prices Foreign (US)
bonds according to M
`($)
t which is not necessarily equal to that when the same investor prices
domestic bonds M `t . However, the SDF can be rewritten such that it applies to any asset by
separating the asset-specific liquidity component—i.e. for a Home investor purchasing Home
and US bonds, respectively:
eξt,κ = Et[Mˆt,t+κRt,κ], e
ξ$t,κ = Et[Mˆt,t+κ
Et+κ
Et R
$
t,κ]
which imply
Et[∆
κet+κ] +
1
2
vart(∆et+κ) = (it,κ − i$t,κ)− covt(mt,t+κ,∆κet+κ)− (ξt,κ − ξ$t,κ)
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which, for a given SDF, requires either a Home expected appreciation (expected depreciation of
dollar) or a fall in the US yield at a range of horizons (maturities) κ—in line with our empirical
evidence. Note that this is consistent with a contemporaneous appreciation of the US dollar.
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